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A Simple Explanation for Why
Campaign Expenditures are Increasing:
the Government is Getting Bigger
John R. Lott, Jr.*
This paper shows that most of the large recent increases in
campaign spending for Federal and state offices can be explained by
higher government spending. This result holds for both Federal and
state legislative campaigns and gubernatorial races and across many
different specifications.Evidence is also examined on whether it is
the composition and not just the level of expenditures which
determines campaign expenditures and whether higher government
expenditures similarly results in more candidates competing for
office. The data provide some indication that legislative term limits
reduce campaign expenditures and increase the number of candidates
running for office. Finally, by focusing on the symptoms and not the
root causes of ever higher campaign expenditures, this paper argues
that the current public policy debate risks changing the form that
payments are made rather than actually restricting the level of
competition.
I. Introduction
Federal campaign spending for all candidates running for the
House and the Senate has risen by 180 percent in real terms from
1976 to 1994, and per capita real expenditures increased by 136
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percent.1 In fact, even before the Federal government started
formally collecting data on campaign contributions, the claims that
too much money was being spent and that those giving the
donations were too influential justified the 1974 Federal law
restricting donations.2 For Presidential campaigns accepting Federal
funding, total dollar spending during the general election is thus now
rigorously limited. More recently, other initiatives have proposed to
limit campaign spending for congressmen and senators with detailed
rules determining how much senators in different states can spend.3
At the state level, Kentucky placed a $1.8 million spending limit on
its gubernatorial candidates in 1995 (Cross, 1995, p. 4B), and similar
legislation was recently introduced in virtually all state legislatures.4
In 1996, Californians are voting on a initiative to limit campaign
expenditures.5 However, the legislative proposals universally
concentrate on the symptoms (restricting the increases) rather than
on the underlying causes. Meanwhile, the debate by economists
largely concerns whether limits benefit incumbents or challengers.
The economics and political science literature fails to discuss why
spending has grown so quickly.
The real increase in campaign expenditures is not an issue
limited only to the Federal government. As Table 1 indicates,
candidates for state legislatures increased campaign expenditures
about half as quickly as those for Federal office. Comparing the ten
states for which campaign expenditure data are available for at least 4
1

Press reports are filled with concerns over these ever growing expenditures. As
Morris (February 6, 1996) writes: “Modern politics is expensive—extremely
expensive—and getting more so with each passing campaign.”
2 A long debate exists over whether campaign contributions go to politicians who
value the same things as the donors or whether the contributions alter how
politicians vote (e.g., Stratmann, 1991 and 1992 and Bronars and Lott, 1993).
3 During the 103rd congress the main proposal on this score was the
Congressional Campaign Spending Limit and Campaign Finance Reform Act (S
3, HR 3). The House bill would have provided public funding to candidates who
accept spending limits, and the Senate version would tax those who breach limits.
4 The support for these limits is quite bi-partisan. For example, in Ohio,
Republicans Gov. George Voinovich and Secretary of State Bob Taft both wanted
strict limits on total campaign expenditures (Miller, 1995, p. 1B).
5 The limits will be set at $300,000 for Assembly races and $500,000 for the state
Senate candidates (Grad, 1995, p. 1)
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state election cycles with both state Senate and House elections, per
capita campaign expenditures rose faster than inflation by 22 percent
in Missouri to as much as 185 percent faster in Oregon. State
gubernatorial campaign expenditures also rose quickly. For the 36
states that held elections in 1982, 1986, and 1990, real per capita
total expenditures rose 58 percent faster than inflation over the
period, and for the states that staged gubernatorial elections every
four years from 1980 to 1992 experienced a 61.8 percent real
increase.
Possibly, expenditures are rising because the costs of advertising
are changing or because the returns to advertising greatly increased
over the last couple of decades.6 Indeed, the change in campaign
expenditures and product advertising have changed in similar ways
during the last couple of decades. While real per capita product
advertising in the United States grew 16 percent slower than real per
capita Federal legislative campaign expenditures from 1976 to 1994,
it grew 26 percent faster than the average for State legislative
campaign expenditures.7
Surprisingly little systematic work has been done to explain the
overall secular increase in product advertising, though portions of
this question have been addressed. For example, Ehrlich and Fisher
(1982) show that advertising intensity may be a substitute for
salesmen and thus increases with the wage of the salesmen, while
increases in the buyers’ wages raises search costs and thus increases
their demand for product information. Pashigian and Bowen (1994)
point to the greater reliance on brand names as female opportunity
costs have risen. However, similar explanations in the context of
campaign expenditures point to changes in the composition of
expenditures (away from using labor intensive methods of
campaigning), without necessarily predicting total expenditures.8
Technological innovations could play a role. Sullivan (1995)
points out that new product introductions have increased because the
6

Of course, this first point depends upon one’s beliefs about the demand elasticity
for advertising. To my knowledge, there are no studies that measure the elasticity
of demand for advertising.
7 This is obtained from various issues of Leading National Advertisers, Inc.’s BAR
Multimedia Reports.
8 Again, this depends upon the demand elasticity of advertising expenditures
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advent of scanner technology reduces the costs of both managing
new line extensions and doing the marketing research required for
introducing a new product. Thus, product advertising expenditures
may have increased simply because the number of new products has
increased (Sullivan, 1995). However, this also provides at least one
reason to expect that product advertising expenditures should have
risen by more than campaign expenditures: while the number of new
product announcements has been increasing over time, the turnover
rate of politicians has been declining over most of the period for
Federal legislative offices (Reed and Schansberg, 1992).
While the work explaining how product advertising has varied
over time is scarce, comparable work on political markets is even
scarcer. The only related papers that explain the trends in total
campaign expenditures discuss the incentives of individual
politicians. Snyder (1990 and 1992) deals with contributions and
Lott (1987a and 1989) focuses on expenditures by asking how past
investments in reputation influence future contributions and
expenditures and how these actions will vary over an individual
politician’s life cycle.9 While Snyder finds that contributions decline
with age and Lott asks whether increased expenditures by the
incumbent or the challenger changes his opponent’s expenditures
and both look at the effect of tenure, no implications are drawn for
how total campaign expenditures have been changing over time.
With the exception of Lott’s (1987a, pp. 238-9) use of per capita
district income, it is not even clear that these results imply systematic
changes in aggregate campaign expenditures.
As just noted in connection with the marketing literature, it
could be that technological or campaign innovations are driving
higher expenditures. Yet, what evidence exists for at least one
possible change indicates that it is a “myth” that “this explosion in
spending is a direct result of the modern campaign’s ever-increasing
dependence on television advertising” (Morris, 1996, p. 1). He
provides some very rough evidence for the Federal House and Senate
9

Another large literature asks who gives to candidates and how politicians’
behavior is affected by these contributions (see e.g., Stratmann), though only one
paper in this area deals with time series data (Bronars and Lott). Another large
literature deals with the marginal support produced from campaign expenditures
by both incumbents and challengers (see, e.g. Kau, et. al., 1982).
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campaigns from 1990 to 1994 that shows no relationship between
the percentage of campaign expenditures spent on radio and
television (both development and airing costs) and total campaign
expenditures.10
Ironically, unless the underlying motivations for the larger
campaign contributions are addressed, the current approach of
simply limiting total expenditures might actually increase the total
societal resources devoted to campaigning. Limits on expenditures
might simply change the form that expenditures take. For example,
where individuals would previously write a check themselves for
$10,000 to a candidate, they now must spend the time to round up
others to contribute. When dollar contributions are limited,
individuals may donate more of their own time (stuffing envelopes or
ringing door bells or lobbying neighbors) when they would have
preferred to make a donation to hire others to do the campaigning.
While restrictions raise the cost of contributions and lower the total
amount of campaigning since these restrictions will force donations
to take less desirable forms, the total portion of society’s wealth
devoted to campaigning can either increase or decrease depending
upon the elasticity of demand.11 If demand is inelastic, total
resources devoted towards campaigning increases.
The following section provides an explanation for increasing
campaign expenditures based upon the growth of government: the
more transfers the government has to offer, the more resources
people will spend to obtain them. Section III examines some time
series evidence linking federal legislative campaign expenditures and
increased federal government expenditures. The main empirical
work starts with Section IV which provides detailed cross-sectional
time-series data linking both state legislative and gubernatorial
10 Morris reports that House incumbents running for reelection from 1990 to
1994 spent between 20 and 25 percent of election year expenditures on all aspects
of radio and television advertising.
11 The problem is similar to price controls. Controls lower the official price paid
for products and reduce the quantity supplied, but these effects in turn leads to
rent seeking by those attempting to have these attractively priced goods allocated
to them. For the marginal person the total price including queuing and other costs
will exceed what the market price had been. In the simple case where all
competitors have the same opportunity costs the total resources spent on acquiring
the good will be greater under price controls.
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campaign expenditures to the growth of state governments. To more
rigorously control for other factors affecting the returns to campaign
expenditures, Section V investigates: changes in the intensity of the
competition due to events like retirements, other measures of the
returns to winning, and any technological changes in running for
office. Evidence is also examined on whether higher government
expenditures increase the returns to higher campaign expenditures or
whether the regressions might be capturing the reverse relationship.
Section VI decomposes the growth in state campaign expenditures
by the type of state government expenditure. Finally, Sections VII
and VIII ask whether higher government expenditures increase the
returns to more politicians running for office or the length of time
politicians remain in office.
II. The “Growing Government” Explanation
for Increasing Campaign Expenditures
This paper offers a simple “growing government” explanation
for why campaign expenditures have increased so dramatically. A
contributor’s demand for a politician winning office is a product of:
1) the marginal increase in the probability of the candidate winning
and 2) the benefit or reward produced by having the politician win
elected office. This benefit may include pecuniary as well as
psychological rewards.12 If one’s candidate wins, that can mean
either increased expected transfers to those one values or to oneself.
In either case, the benefits are related to the size and scope of the
government. As government has more favors to grant, the resources
spent in trying to obtain those favors should increase.13
12

Presumably, if the level of government expenditures is related to the prestige
associated with the office, even a candidate may be willing to spend more of his
own money in order to win office.
13 While this paper asks how the size of government affects competition in the
political market, Besley and Case (1995b) and Crain and Oakley (1995) provide
interesting evidence that the size of government is affected by constitutional
restrictions on the political market such as term limits for governors and whether
an initiative process is present. Besley and Case (1995a) also ask how the taxes in
neighboring state governments affect the outcome of a state’s gubernatorial
elections. Peltzman (1992) examines the relationship between the size of
government and its effect on elections. Others have looked the relationship
between the organization of Congress and spending by looking at the effect of
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In general, rent seeking takes many forms (Tullock, 1967).14
Specifically with regard to government transfers, Browning (1974)
and Tullock (1974) have also described the time investments made
by politicians and bureaucrats in competing for resources. In
addition, constituents and other interest groups obviously spend time
assisting in campaigns to affect political wealth transfers. If these
costs were as easily measurable as campaign expenditures, one would
expect to find that they also vary with the size of government. While
Laband and Sophocleus (1992, pp. 969-70) mention PACs and
broadly discuss how rent seeking can involve campaign
contributions, even they do not attempt to explain campaign
expenditures when measuring the United States’ rent seeking costs.15
There is also the question that government transfers take many
forms. If the hypothesis presented here is correct, increased abilities
to transfer wealth in any form (e.g., regulations or expropriation of
property) should lead to increased campaign expenditures.16
Government expenditures are just one proxy for this increased ability
to create transfers. For example, even though the earlier mentioned
evidence that Federal campaign expenditures have increased faster
than state campaign expenditures is consistent with the Federal
government’s expenditures growing 59 percent faster than state
expenditures from 1976 to 1992,17 it is also consistent with the
congressional tenure on whether politicians vote for increased spending (Reed and
Schansberg, 1994 and Lott and Bronars, 1993). Dick and Lott (1993) also argue
that legislative term limits will reduce the size of government.
14 Organizations like Common Cause are quick to point to gifts, junkets, meals,
and drinks bought by lobbyists.
15 Abrams and Settle (1976) look at very rough time series expenditure data for
Presidential elections from 1872 to 1972 to estimate the cost savings from their
proposal to randomly select 1 million Americans “every four years to vote for
everyone else” (p. 47). Our discussion here brings the savings that they claim into
question since the “bigger government” hypothesis would imply that the
competition for each of those 1 million voters would simply be more intense.
16 Regulations are broadly meant to include not only economics regulations
involving firms but also other types of transfers that government can create such as
whether abortion will be legalized or people can own guns for self-defense.
Likewise, other issues like trade policy are also included.
17 Table 2 indicates that during the period from 1976 to 1992 Federal legislative
campaign expenditures rose by 137.5 and that the increases in either state
gubernatorial or legislative expenditures were less than half as large.
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growth in the Federal government’s relative importance on
regulatory issues. The evidence presented here examines
expenditures simply because it is easily measured. No alternative
measure exists across states that allows us to compare the changing
level of transfers created through regulations.
To determine whether the “growing government” explanation is
correct, other explanations must be controlled for and will be
discussed in more depth in Section V. Yet, altruism is certainly one
alternative explanation for campaign donations. Presumably, higher
campaign contributions include the possibility that giving to
campaigns is like giving to charitable organizations in that it
increases with income (e.g., Roberts, 1984). Changing opportunity
costs as measured by income might affect the mix of campaign
produced information and thus might affect total campaign
expenditures in an analogous way to our discussion of Ehrlich and
Fisher’s (1982) and Pashigian and Bowen’s (1994) work. In addition,
enough campaigns may have become closer contests over time and
thus caused expenditures to rise for a reason that is completely
unrelated to the level of government wealth transfers. For example,
retirements generally increase the number of candidates who
compete for a seat and are associated with increased campaign
expenditures.
III. Some Suggestive Time-Series Evidence
for Federal Legislative Offices
Federal data for legislative offices are limited by the fact that
data on campaign donations and expenditures were not
systematically reported until the 1975-1976 election cycle. Using the
data up until the most recent election thus covers only 10 election
cycles, and thus can only be viewed as suggestive.18 The only major
change in campaign finance laws occurred in 1974, prior to when the

18

While running the regressions on data for individual races would produce many
more observations, no new real information would be produced with respect to the
size of the Federal or state government since those vary at either the Federal or
state levels.
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campaign data were collected.19 The “Growing Government”
hypothesis states that Federal election expenditures should be
positively related to government expenditures.
We regress the natural log of the total real Senate plus House
campaign expenditures in both the primary and general elections on
the natural log of the election year’s real Federal Budget
expenditures. The regression attempts to measure political
competition using the number of candidates running in the primary
and general elections during that campaign cycle, changes in the
desire to make charitable contributions or opportunity costs of voters
by using per capita income, the scale effects of campaigning by
controlling for the nation’s population, and any secular changes that
are likely to have been occurring by using a time trend variable. The
sample means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2, and
all values are in real 1992 dollars. This specification yields the
following results:20 Rerunning regressions (1) and (3) using the
Cochrane-Orcutt method produces virtually the same estimates.21

19 In an important sense the campaign expenditure limits have become
consistently more binding over time since campaign donation limits were set in
nominal terms.
20 The data on total real Senate and House campaign expenditures in both the
primary and general elections along with the data on the number of candidates
running in the primary and general elections during a campaign cycle were
obtained from press releases published by the Federal Election Commission. Data
on population, gross national product, and the Federal budget expenditures were
obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
21 Rerunning specifications 1 and 3 using the Cochrane-Orcutt method raises the tstatistic of Ln (Federal Gov Budget Expenditures) to 2.647 and of Federal Gov
Budget Exp./Population to 5.121.
In addition, recognizing that using population as an explanatory variable on the
right hand side of equations (3) and (4) can produce artificial collinearity due to
measurement error, specifications (3) and (4) were also reestimated after all the
variables were multiplied by the population, though the results were essentially
unchanged. Rerunning these regressions by replacing all these variables with their
differences and dropping the time trend variable produces similar economic,
though less statistically significant, results. For the specifications analogous to
equations (1) and (3), the coefficients for the differences in the natural log and per
capita government spending are significant at only the .15 level for a two-tailed ttest.

Ln (Federal Legislative Campaign Expenditures) = 0.1669 Ln (Federal Gov Budget Expenditures)
(2.307)
-8.97 E-6 (GDP/Population) + 2.72 E-5 Number of Candidates - 3.64 E-8 Population
(0.799)
(0.83)
(2.215)
Adj-R2 = 0.9770 Observations = 10
DW-statistic = 2.7189

+ 0.1061 Time Trend + 32.304
(2.768)
(8.554)

(1)

Ln (Federal Legislative Campaign Expenditures) = 0.6071 Ln (Federal Gov Budget Expenditures)
(4.54)
+ 0.0002648 Number of Candidates - 14.68
(3.39)
(1.97)

Adj-R2 = 0.8660 Observations = 10
DW-statistic = 1.878

(2)

Absolute t-statistics are shown in parentheses. We also reestimated these specifications by replacing the
logarithmic values for campaign and budget expenditures with their per capita values.

10

(Federal Legislative Campaign Exp./Population) = 0.001198 (Federal Gov Budget Exp./Population)
(2.291)
+ 0.00007 (GDP/Population) + 0.0003 Number of Candidates +
(0.884)
(1.576)

3.08 E-7 Population
(2.013)

Adj-R2 = 0.8611 Observations = 10
DW-statistic = 1.5857

- 0.77668 Time Trend - 71.584
(2.041)
(2.080)

(3)

(Federal Legislative Campaign Exp./Population) = 5.379 E-4 (Federal Gov Budget Exp./Population)
(3.50)
+ 4.752 E-4 Number of Candidates - 1.510
(3.58)
(2.24)

Adj-R2 = 0.8344 Observations = 10
DW-statistic = 1.9949

11

(4)
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The only variables that are consistently significant at the .10
level for a two-tailed t-test are the ones that measure Federal budget
expenditures. However, not only are the budget variables
consistently significant, they also indicate some economic
importance. A one standard deviation change in the Federal budget
produces more than a one standard deviation change in campaign
expenditures in specification 3, while a one standard deviation
change in the Federal budget explains about half of a one standard
deviation change in campaign expenditures in specification 4. The
impact of government expenditures on campaign expenditures can
be seen in another way. For example, while real per capita Federal
budget expenditures increased from $4,219 to $5,320 between 1976
and 1994 and real per capita Federal legislative campaign
expenditures rose from $1.12 to $2.64, specification (3) implies that
$1.32 (or 87 percent) of the $1.52 increase in campaign expenditures
was explained by rising Federal government expenditures.1
As with any purely time-series data, there is always the concern
that Federal campaign expenditures are merely correlated with some
other variable which Federal government expenditures is tracking.
As a simple test, I replaced Federal campaign expenditures with total
national product advertising in the United States and reestimated the
preceding four regressions.2 The specifications that corresponded to
regressions (1) and (3) produced the opposite relationship to that
which was found for campaign expenditures. Using the CochraneOrcutt method, the respective t-statistics were -2.620 and -6.215.3
1

In an important sense the campaign expenditure limits have become consistently
more binding over time since campaign donation limits were set in nominal terms.
I attempted to test whether this constraint reduced campaign expenditures by
including a separate variable for the price index. While the coefficient was
negative, it was insignificant with t-statistics having values less than 1.
2 This is obtained from various issues of Leading National Advertisers, Inc.’s BAR
Multimedia Reports.
3 The regressions were as follows:
Ln (National Advertising Expenditures) = -.3847 Ln (Federal Gov Budget Expenditures) + .00061
(GDP/Population)
(2.620)
(2.943)

- .000038 Number of Candidates + 1.58 E-9 Population + 0.0520 Time Trend + 22.76
(0.583)
(0.050)
(0.742)
(3.327)
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The specifications that corresponded to specifications (2) and (4)
produced budget expenditure variables that were positive but
insignificant. Finally, regressing either the natural log of federal
legislative campaign expenditures or per capita federal legislative
campaign expenditures on national advertising expenditures, federal
budget expenditures, and per capita income still produces a positive
and significant relationship between campaign and budget
expenditures.
IV. Cross-Sectional Time-Series Evidence
on State Campaign Expenditures
One clear drawback with using the Federal campaign
expenditures is the very small number of time series observations. In
addition, with so many variables increasing over time, government
expenditures may be merely proxying for some other left out
variables. Obviously, cross-sectional data are not readily available for
the Federal legislature because all Federal legislators face the same
set of transfers to draw on. In contrast, studying the states allows us
to pool together the time-series and cross-sectional evidence on how
their legislative campaign expenditures vary with the size of their
state governments.
Letters to all state Secretary of States and state election
commissions and follow-up telephone calls produced time series
cross-sectional data on total campaign expenditures during each
election cycle for sixteen states: Alabama (1990), Alaska (1976 to

Adj-R2 = 0.9939 F-statistic = 259.74 Observations = 10

(1’)

(National Advertising Expenditures/Pop.) =
-.000096 (Federal Gov Budget Expenditures/Pop) + 9.06 E-6 (GDP/Population)
(6.215)
(4.765)
- .000013 Number of Candidates - 1.25 E-8 Population + 0.0406 Time Trend + 3.0118
(2.176)
(3.298)
(4.232)
(3.488)
Adj-R2 = 0.9958 F-statistic = 384.09 Observations = 10

(3’)

Eliminating the number of candidates variable form regressions 1’ and 3’ still
leaves Federal budget expenditures coefficient significantly negative with tstatistics of -2.96 and -3.77.
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1992), California (1976 to 1992), Connecticut (1988 to 1992),
Florida (1978 to 1992), Idaho (1976 to 1992), Kansas (1982 to
1990), Massachusetts (1986 to 1992), Michigan (1978 to 1992),
Missouri (1978 to 1990), North Carolina (1990 to 1992), New
Mexico (1988 to 1990), Ohio (1990 to 1992), Oklahoma (1988 to
1992), Oregon (1972 to 1992), and Washington (1978 to 1992, with
the exception of 1986) (see the appendix for a detailed discussion of
these data sources). Ninety-one observations on total primary and
general election campaign expenditures were obtained for the state
houses and eighty-one for the state senates, though the number of
observations is reduced to sixty-nine and sixty-one respectively when
other variables are included to measure such things as the total
number of candidates, how competitive individual’s general and
primary races were, and whether an incumbent was running for reelection.
However, before proceeding with a more detailed analysis of the
state level data which controls for other factors explaining the
changing levels of campaign expenditures, two scatter plots may help
illustrate the strong relationship between campaign spending and
state government spending. Figures 1 and 2 show these scatter plots
of all 91 State House observations and all 81 State Senate
observations linking campaign expenditures with government
expenditures. The Pearson correlation coefficients for the State
House observations is 0.912 and for the State Senate 0.885 (both are
statistically significant at the .01 level). Similar high and significant
correlations are obtained whether one compares per capita measures
of campaign and government expenditures (for the State Houses
correlation is 0.9454 and for the State Senates 0.9427) or compares
the natural log of these per capita values (for State Houses it is
0.8077 and the State Senates 0.8015). Thus, there appears to be a
very strong relationship between government expenditures and
campaign contributions.
The simplest specifications regressed total real legislative
campaign expenditures for those years where both Senate and House
took place on real state expenditures in 1992 dollars, the number of
people living in a state, and total number of major party candidates
running for office.

15
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The Relationship Between Total Campaign
Spending for State Houses and State
Government Expenditures

Ln (Real Total Campaign Expenditures by all Candidates
for State House Offices in Millions of 1992 Dollars)

4.5
4

3.5
3
2.5
2
Series1
1.5
1
0.5
0
0

1

2

3

4

-0.5
-1
Ln (Real State Government Expenditures in
Billions of 1992 Dollars)

Figure 1
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The Relationship Between Total Campaign
Expenditures for State Senates and State
Government Expenditures

Ln (Total Campaign Spending for all Candidates running
for a State's Senate in Millions of 1992 Dollars)

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5
Series1
1

0.5

0
0

1

2

3

4

5

-0.5

-1
Ln (Real State Government Expenditures in Billions of
1992 Dollars)

Figure 2
Table 2 shows the sample means and standard deviations for
these variables. Again, we included both the natural logarithmic
values of the expenditure variables and also those expenditure
variables on a per capita basis. The results for these simple
specifications are:

Ln (Total State Legislative Campaign Expenditures) = 0.64648 Ln (State Gov Budget Expenditures)
(5.60)
+ 0.000068 (Per Capita Income) - 2.8 E-8 Population + 0.0014 Total Candidates - 0.75
(4.88)
(2.10)
(2.65)
(0.31)
2
Adj-R = 0.806196
Observations = 61

(5)

Total State Legislative Campaign Expenditures/Population = 0.00093 State Gov Budget
Exp/Population
(14.57)
+ 0.000197 (Per Capita Income) - 3.6 E-8 Population + 0.0012 Total Candidates - 3.71
(4.63)
(2.70)
(1.78)
(5.42)
Adj-R2 = 0.90289

(6)

Observations = 61

The results again are not only statistically but also economically significant. While specification 5
implies that a one standard deviation change in state budget expenditures can explain 62 percent of a
standard deviation change in a state’s total legislative campaign expenditures, specification 6 implies that
the percentage explained is 80 percent.
For gubernatorial elections the data on campaign expenditures is much more complete. Time-series
cross-sectional campaign expenditure data for all 50 states is available for gubernatorial elections from the
Book of the States. The dates for which the data are available are summarized in Table 1. Figure 3 shows
these scatter plots of all 178 gubernatorial observations linking campaign expenditures with government
expenditures.

17

Generally, the relationship is not as strong as with the legislative data as the Pearson correlation
coefficients is 0.7720, though it is still statistically significant at the .01 level. Similar lower, though still
statistically significant, correlations are obtained whether one compares per capita measures of campaign
and government expenditures (0.6986) or compares the natural log of these per capita values (0.6504).
Running the same specifications using the gubernatorial data that we used for the legislative data we
obtained:
Ln (Total State Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures) = 0.7481 Ln (State Gov Budget Expenditures)
(7.524)
1.42 E-6 (Per Capita Income) - 7.66 E-9 Population + 0.1933 Total Candidates - 2.332
(0.088)
(0.413)
(6.757)
(1.114)
Adj-R2 = 0.6162

(7)

Observations = 168

Total State Gubernatorial Campaign Exp./Population = 0.00166 State Gov Budget Exp/Population
(13.656)
- 8.17 E-5 (Per Capita Income) - 6.40 E-8 Population + 0.3850 Total Candidates - 1.3658
(1.758)
(2.466)
(5.334)
(1.672)
Adj-R2 = 0.6828

Observations = 168

18

(8)
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Th e R e l a t i on sh i p B e t w e en To ta l
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Figure 3
These preliminary regressions again imply a strong relationship
between campaign and state government expenditures. Not only are
the coefficients for budget expenditures statistically significant, but
these two specification imply that a one standard deviation increase
in per capita state government expenditures can explain between 67
and 73 percent of a one standard deviation in gubernatorial

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

20

campaign expenditures. By contrast the only other variable that is
consistently significant in both specifications is the total number of
candidates, and a one standard deviation change in the number of
candidates explains only between 26 and 31 percent of a one
standard deviation change in campaign expenditures. The biggest
difference between state legislative and gubernatorial specifications is
that while income was significant and positive in explaining
legislative campaign expenditures it is either insignificant or negative
and significant in explaining gubernatorial campaign expenditures.1
The most surprising result from this raw data is that total state
legislative and gubernatorial and Federal campaign expenditures
represent such a small fraction of government expenditures. Though
as Tullock (1989 and 1995) and Laband and Sophocleus (1992, pp.
967-8) have pointed out, this rent-seeking puzzle exists more
generally. With respect to our data, total state legislative and
gubernatorial campaign contributions represent about a tenth of one
percent of state government expenditures, and the percentage for the
federal government is less than half of them. Possibly, as Laband
and Sophocleus (1988 and 1992) argue, competition to obtain
wealth transfers is merely taking other forms.
V. Controlling for Other Factors that Determine the
Level of Legislative Campaign Expenditures
A. Measuring Changes in Competition, the Returns to Winning Office,
and the Technology of Running for Office
Obviously, other factors influence the campaign expenditures,
though only the state level data affords us enough observations to
control for these effects. The three most obvious variables to control
for are the intensity of the competition, other measures of the return
to winning a race, and any technological changes in running for
office. With respect to the intensity of competition, there may be
year-to-year variations in competition resulting from such things as
1

Again, recognizing that using population as an explanatory variable on the
right hand side of equations (6) and (8) can produce artificial collinearity due to
measurement error, both specifications were then reestimated after all the
variables were multiplied by the population, though the results were essentially
unchanged.
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retirements and not simply from changes in the level of government
transfers. We have tried to measure competition in two ways. The
first method is similar to creating a variable like that used in the
analysis of Federal campaign expenditures which controls for the
number of candidates running for office. This measure is however
probably less useful for cross-sectional state legislative races than for
federal legislative offices since, unlike the Federal system during this
period, the number of seats being competed for vary not only across
states but also over time within some states. To address this concern,
the odd number specifications in Tables 3 through 8 not only
control for the number of seats being decided in an election, but
they also control for the number of candidates per seat. This effect is
allowed to vary by party so that the variables take the form of the
number of Republican candidates (primary plus general election)
divided by the number of seats and the number of Democratic
candidates (primary plus general election) divided by the number of
seats. Earlier work found that campaign expenditures for the U.S.
House of Representatives in 1978 were greatest for the closest
expected races and that an incumbent’s past tenure and past
campaign expenditures reduced opponent’s expenditures and
increased his own (Lott, 1987a). The odd number legislative
specifications also control for how competitive general election,
Republican primary, and Democratic primary races are by including
measures for the percent of races in these three categories: where
there were no challengers, where there were no incumbents, where
incumbents opposed each other, and whether the winner won by
less than 5 percent, between 5 and 10 percent, between 10 and 15
percent, or between 15 and 20 percent. The intercept then
represents the case where there is a challenger facing an incumbent
and the election outcome is decided by 20 or more percent.
Excluding the variable measuring the total number of candidates
running for either the State House or Senate, there are 24 other
variables that we will use to measure the degree of competition for
these elective offices.
While we do not control for incumbent’s past campaign
expenditures, a separate unreported set of regressions were run on a
smaller data set that included a variable for the percent of races with
incumbents having served eight or more years as a proxy for past
investments in reputation or sorting of politicians by ability.
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However, this variable was never significant and did not alter the
results pertaining to government budget expenditures. The data
sources for all the variables that control for the intensity of
competition are discussed in the appendix.
Two points should be raised with respect to all of the variables
which measure the intensity of the competition for office. The main
issue is that it is not obvious a priori what the signs for the variables
measuring the closeness of the elections are expected to be. For
example, expenditures might be higher when races are decided by less
than 5 percent than when the winning margin is between 15 and
20 percent, but it is also possible that candidates committed to
making large campaign expenditures discourage strong challengers
(e.g., Hersch and McDougall, 1994).
Another issue is that to a large extent measures of the intensity
of electoral competition might be proxying for the same things
being measured by the state government expenditures. After all, if
the government has no transfers to hand out, it makes little
difference who wins the race and there should be no motivation to
vary expenditures whether races are close or not. Focusing only on
state government spending, when measures of the intensity of
competition are included in the regressions, is thus likely to
underestimate the true impact government transfers have on
determining campaign expenditures.
A second category of control variables involves other measures of
the return to candidates winning office besides the size of
government. For example, the benefit from winning a race depends
not only on the transfers the government creates, but also on the
effect the race will have on the distribution of those transfers. One
way this can manifest itself is whether it will effect who controls the
majority in the legislative body. Being in the majority provides large
benefits in determining such questions as which pieces of legislation
will come to the floor for a vote. The biggest marginal returns to a
political party acquiring an additional legislative seat is thus likely to
be when that marginal seat determines which party will control as
the majority party in that body (Crain and Tollison, 1976 and Jung,
et al., 1994). However, as a political party adds to its majority, the
marginal return to it acquiring additional seats in that legislature
increases if additional seats increase the certainty that the majority
will be able to shape outcomes to its liking, though there are likely to
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be diminishing marginal returns. This is controlled for by taking the
percentage difference in representation between the Republicans
and the Democrats in the State House and then likewise for the
Senate in each election year. The data were obtained from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Economists have also long argued that the value of obtaining a
political office depends upon how long lived the property rights are
to that office. Offices that have longer terms or that allow politicians
to remain in office for an unlimited number of terms are more
valuable, and politicians will spend more to try and obtain them.
Crain and Tollison (1977) provide some weak evidence that
campaign expenditures were greater for gubernatorial elections
where the winner received a four year term than where the terms
were two years long. They also found that gubernatorial term limits
that restricted the number of successive terms a governor could hold
office reduced campaign expenditures (see also Besley and Case,
1995b, p. 793). Term limits seem likely to lower expenditures if only
because of the reduced incentives to creating long term sunk
nontransferable political reputations, and this effect is compounded
by the fact that reduced returns to creating nontransferable
individual reputations also reduce entry barriers (Lott, 1987a).
However, Crain and Tollison’s (1977) study was quite limited in
that it examined only cross-sectional evidence and was unable to
control for any other factors which could affect the level of
campaign expenditures.
While longer terms will increase campaign expenditures when a
race takes place, the question is whether this rule will increase total
campaign expenditures. Will the campaign expenditures for two
two-year terms be equal to one 4-year term? The preliminary
evidence from Crain and Tollison indicate that in fact total
expenditures are higher for two 2-year terms, though they did not
provide an explanation for why this might be so. One possibility is
that there are diminishing returns to creating transfers, and that
when one is elected the transfers with the greatest marginal return
are made first. The second 2-year term would thus not be worth as
much as the first 2-year term, and the return to getting one’s favorite
politician into office for four years is not worth twice as much as
getting one in there for two years. Evidence for a very similar story is
provided by Jung, et al. (1994) in explaining why voters do not elect
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identically voting senators from the same state.2 Their explanation
focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful
constituencies’ returns to obtaining additional transfers through
electing another senator to represent them.
Variations based upon both the length of terms and limiting the
number of terms exist for state legislative offices. If term limits
reduce total expenditures, recent initiatives that have imposed
legislative term limits provide an opportunity to test it. Data were
obtained from U.S. Term Limits listing what states adopted
legislative term limits in what years. A dummy variable was included
which equaled one in the year that term limits were passed (on the
belief that campaign expenditures would already have been effected
due to the expectations that limits were being passed). Limiting the
term limit dummy to only those states where it was already in effect
would have limited the dummy to being equal to one for only two
observations: California and Oklahoma in 1992. The reported
regression specifications were rerun using this narrower definition of
the term limit dummy, but it does not affect the results. Florida,
Ohio, and Washington passed their initiatives during 1992, the last
year that we have observations on those states.
With respect to each term’s length, all the State House
candidates in the sample served two year terms, though there was a
fair amount of variation with respect to State Senates: Alabama,
Alaska, California, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington have 4 years
terms and Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, North Carolina have
2 year terms. A variable is included for the length of each term to
control for the differing values of holding these different length
offices.
Finally, we recognize the possibility of technological change.
Over the time studied, innovations include computers, refinements
in polling, and mass mailings. While the paper does not include
specific variables that reflect such changes since neither measures of
how much state level campaigns spent on different portions of their
campaigns nor indexes of these costs are available, it is hoped that
2

For related discussions see also Peltzman (1976).
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the year and regional dummies will proxy for these changes.3 If
changes in campaign techniques are disseminated and adopted
quickly across states, the year dummies should pick up any effects
that may exist.4 We are less concerned about identifying what
changes in campaign technology may have affected campaign
expenditures than we are about making sure that the changes in
government expenditures may not accidentally proxy for some left
out affects. Year dummies also help us to pick up any increased
competition resulting from redistricting in 1982 and 1992. Because
of the small number of observations, regional dummies for only six
areas are used: the west, the south, the midwest, the northeast,
Alaska, and Hawaii, with the northeast being the excluded variable.5
Data for Hawaii are only available in the gubernatorial data set.
Alaska and Hawaii are given their own dummy variables because of
3 All the regressions reported were also run using individual state dummies,
though the results for the gubernatorial regressions indicate that while the
relationship between campaign and state government expenditures remains
positive, it is no longer always significant for the specifications that examine
the log of total campaign expenditures on the log of total state government
expenditures. Given that 72 percent of the states only had three gubernatorial
campaign observations including a separate state dummy for each state
dramatically reduces the variance that can be explained by the other variables.
Six of the states only have between one and three observations for state House
and Senate elections, which also limits the amount of information that is
available after individual state dummies are used in those regressions.
4 In the results that follow were also rerun with a time trend in place of the
year dummies just to check the consistency of the results with those reported
earlier for the Federal government and the results were similar. Given the
advantages of using year dummies over a time trend, the Federal data would
have ideally used year dummies, but that was impossible due to the limitations
of using time series data. See also footnote 13 for a related discussion.
5 The West includes Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico; the South
includes Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South
Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennesse, Arkansas, and Oklahoma; the
Midwest includes North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota,
Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and
West Virginia; and the remaining states in the Northeast are classified under
that label. Not all of these states have data when we examine legislative
expenditures. Those states where data is available are still placed into the above
categories.
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their unusually high costs and per capita incomes. Including Alaska
as part of the west doubles the t-statistics for the per capita
government expenditure variables and leaves the ln(state
expenditures) largely unchanged.6
B. The Results for State Campaign Expenditures After Controlling for
Other Effects
We divide up legislative expenditures between state house and senate
races because there are not enough observations for us to control for
all the different measures of the level of competition for both types
of races in one regression. Tables 3 and 4 present the results when
the control variables described in Section III.A. are used. In all cases,
the relationship between state budget expenditures and state House
or Senate campaign expenditures continues to be both statistically
and economically significant. For example, using specifications 1 and
3 in both tables and the standard deviations corresponding to the
samples in these regressions implies that a one standard deviation
change in state government spending will explain between 52 and
83 percent of a one standard deviation change in state House
campaign spending and between 71 and 84 percent of a one
standard deviation change in state Senate campaign spending.
Another way of gauging the economic importance of these
results is to compare the actual change in campaign expenditures
with the predicted amounts. Seven states were available in both 1978
and 1992 for both the House and Senate data sets. Using
specification 3 in both tables, the change in per capita state
government expenditures implied that per capita state House and
state Senate campaign expenditures should have risen by 53 and 55
cents respectively. The actual increases were 58 and 49 cents. While
other variables such as the closeness of races changed over time,
simply taking account of higher state government expenditures
explains either 92 or 111 percent of the eventual increase.
Combining specification 3 from both Tables 3 and 4 indicates
that a $1000 increase in per capita state government expenditures (an
increase of less than a third for these observations) will increase real
per capita state legislative campaign expenditures by 35 percent (or 99
6

Alaska makes up 13 percent of the sample for both the state House and
Senate samples.
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cents). While other variables are at times significant, only the
coefficient for state expenditures is statistically significant in all the
specifications.
The only other variables that indicate a consistent, though not
always statistically significant, pattern are term limits, the state’s
population, general election races with incumbents (particularly
senate incumbents), and the percentage of seats in the general
election that were won by less than 5 percent. Term limits generally
imply lower campaign expenditures, the larger states tend to exhibit
some diseconomies in campaigning, and the absence of incumbents
in the general election or the more general election races that are
decided by less than 5 percent the higher are campaign expenditures.
The percentage difference in party control of the legislative bodies
was consistently negative as predicted only for senate races, and even
then it was statistically significant only once. Possibly because of the
very few number of observations, term limits was only negative and
statistically significant in only one of the specifications.7
Since I had no strong prior beliefs concerning the exact
functional relationship between state government expenditures and
income, specifications 3 and 4 in these two tables were rerun with a
new variable included for squared per capita income.8 The
coefficients indicated that campaign expenditures increased at a
decreasing rate with income, though neither of these variables were
ever statistically significant. At least for legislative races, the bottom
line seems to be that it is the amount transfers controlled by the
government that determines campaign expenditures and not the
potential income that governments can acquire as represented by a
state’s personal income.
7

The year dummies were almost always insignificant, and they only implied a
consistent (though insignificant) pattern in the state senate regressions
examining per capita campaign expenditures.
8 At the suggestion of a referee, additional variables were also added to control
for a state’s urbanization (measured either in terms of population per square
mile or the percent of a state’s population living in a SMSA). This was done
with using state and year fixed effects and the other variables discussed above
and it did not alter the findings.
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C. The Relationship Between State Government Expenditures and
Gubernatorial Campaign Expenditures
The specifications for gubernatorial campaign expenditures are
generally very similar to those for legislators. However, several
relatively small differences do arise. For example, since we are dealing
with only one office being contested in any state during any year we
can easily measure the winning margin between the top two
candidates in the general and primary elections as a continuous
variable. This winning margin is measured in percentage points.
Term limits are also much more common and variable for governors
than legislators during our sample, thus allowing us to control for
the effect of the term limit lengths. Following Crain and Tollison
(1977) we assume that the longer politicians are allowed to serve as
governor, the more valuable becomes the property right and hence
the greater campaign expenditures. Presumably, this is true whether
one is talking about the limits imposed by term limits or limits on
the length of any given term. If Jung et. al. (1994) are correct, a
divided legislature should reduce the returns to winning the
governorship because opposing political parties can already ameliorate
the more extreme wealth transfers proposed by the other party. This
is controlled for by a dummy variable that equals one whenever
opposing parties control the different houses. The variables that
measure the margin of party control in the state houses and senates
use the absolute percent differences between the parties in each
body. (In all these cases Nebraska was excluded from the sample,
though setting its values to zero and including it does not affect the
results.)
The results shown in Table 5 are fairly similar to those already
reported. State government expenditures again stands out as the
most consistently significant coefficient and these coefficients are
always positive and economically large. The state government
expenditure coefficients imply that a one standard deviation increase
in government expenditures can explain between 54 and 69 percent
of a one standard deviation change in state gubernatorial campaign
spending. Using specifications 3 and 4, thousand dollar increase in
per capita state government expenditures implies about a 60 percent
increase in total gubernatorial campaign expenditures.
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Other results also tend to be more consistently significant then
in the smaller data sets that we used for legislative offices. The most
consistent results indicate that campaign expenditures are highest
when no incumbent is running and the winning margin between
the top two general or primary election candidates is small.9 Term
limits again decrease campaign expenditures, and the effect can be
quite large: increasing a governor’s maximum tenure from 8 years to
16 can increase the average campaign expenditures by as much as 31
percent. However, the results also present something of a puzzle.
Increasing term lengths has the surprising effect of lowering
campaign contributions, and this effect can also be quite large,
though it is statistically significant in only two specifications. Using
specifications 3 and 4, increasing terms lengths from 2 to 4 years,
reduces expenditures by more than an increase in term limits from 8
to 16 years. The results continue to indicate that per capita income is
not particularly important in explaining campaign expenditures.
Data on two types of campaign expenditure limit laws were also
collected: dummy variables for whether there are limits on
contributions and for whether corporations are allowed to make
contributions. These variables were not statistically significant and
their inclusion did not alter the other results presented in the paper.
D. The Question of Causality
Do higher government expenditures increase the returns to
higher campaign expenditures or are the regressions capturing the
reverse relationship? Higher government spending could be the
result of higher campaign expenditures, as winning candidates may
provide greater transfers to those groups that gave them money (e.g.,
Baron, 1989).10 Alternatively, however, winning candidates may
reduce existing negative transfers from their supporters. It is not
obvious whether higher campaign expenditures will generally be
followed by either greater or lower transfers.
9 The year dummies were again almost always insignificant.
10 Baron (1989) models a contest where candidates offer political

services or
interventions with the bureaucracy to attract contributions. The greater the
expected offered level of services the greater the contributions made to the
campaign.
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Yet, even if higher past campaign contributions do increase
future government expenditures, some evidence already exists on the
timing of campaign expenditures and changes in legislative
outcomes. Bronars and Lott (1993) show that while campaign
contributions do not alter how individual politicians vote, donors
give money to politicians who agree with the donors.11 Other
evidence also indicates that individual politicians exhibit extremely
stable voting patterns over time (Lott and Davis, 1992; Poole and
Romer, 1993; and Lott and Bronars, 1993). There appears to be
little possibility of contributions bribing existing politicians into
voting differently. Instead, the way to produce new government
policies is to alter the legislature’s composition and larger campaign
expenditures can help do this. Any reward to donors from electing a
different type of politician does not occur until after the election,
and should not be a major problem here as we use contemporaneous
campaign and budget expenditure data for our regressions. Thus, if a
group spends a lot of money to elect a big-spending politician,
government spending today is not affected, and cannot produce a
false positive relationship between the contemporaneous values for
campaign and budget expenditures.
However, it might be claimed that campaign expenditures in a
given year are not truly determined anew every year, but depend on
their own past levels,12 and that its own past levels also affect the
current level of government spending, so that a spurious relationship
might arise simply by looking at contemporaneous values of
campaign and budget expenditures. Past campaign expenditures
11

By combining the campaign contributions literature with the evidence that
politicians intrinsically value policy outcomes, Bronars and Lott (1993) tests
whether politicians’ voting patterns change when the retire and no longer face
the threat of lost campaign contributions. If contributions are causing
individual politicians to vote differently, there should be systematic changes i n
voting behavior when future contributions are eliminated. On the other hand,
if voters give to candidates who intrinsically value the same policies that they
do, there should be no last period changes in how a politician votes. The
evidence strongly confirms this second hypothesis.
12 There is some evidence that an individual’s past campaign expenditures
affects his level of current campaign expenditures (Lott, 1987a). There is also
the possibility that there are other unmeasured factors that determine a state’s
legislative or gubernatorial campaign expenditures over time and that a state’s
campaign expenditures are correlated over time because of these factors.
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could then be viewed as a third variable influencing campaign
spending and current government expenditures. A simple way to
account for such a possibility is to include past campaign
expenditures as an explanatory variable. Thus, we reran the second
and forth specifications in Tables 3, 4, and 5 by including a variable
for the preceding election’s campaign expenditures.
The results reported in Table 6 consistently support the earlier
findings that higher government spending produces significantly
higher campaign expenditures, and the sizes of these coefficients are
between 78 and 104 percent of their corresponding values in the
earlier reported specifications. Though the coefficients for lagged
campaign expenditures are always positive, they are statistically
significant in only four of the six specifications. The other
coefficients are generally similar, though less significant, than those
shown in earlier specifications. For example, the gubernatorial
evidence on shorter length term limits reducing campaign
expenditures is similar to the evidence reported in Table 5, and the
legislative evidence that term limits reduce expenditures remains
extremely weak.
To deal with the question of whether lagged campaign
expenditures increase or decrease current government expenditures,
government expenditures were also run on both lagged campaign
expenditures and government expenditures. Lagged government
expenditures are included because of the large literature that indicates
that current government expenditures are not determined
independently of past expenditures (e.g., Higgs, 1987). Some have
even argued that past government expenditures generate support for
future transfers (e.g., Lott, 1990). Again, both the per capita and
natural logged values of government expenditures and campaign
expenditures are examined, though this time we only control for the
most obvious explanatory variables for government growth: per
capita income, population, those two variables squared, and year and
regional dummy variables (see also Peltzman, 1980, pp. 266-271).13
13

The use here of regional dummy variables can also be roughly interpreted i n
terms of Case et. al’s (1993) and Besley and Case’s (1995a) papers suggesting
that state spending may respond to spending decisions made in neighboring
states and to yardstick competition morer generally. The variables that
Peltzman uses for education are not used here because we accept Lott’s (1990)
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Using the other control variables employed in Table 6 or the squared
values of income and population tends to make the coefficients
reported for lagged campaign expenditures slightly more negative.14
These new results are reported in Table 7 and indicate that past
campaign expenditures significantly decrease current government
expenditures as frequently as they increase them. There is no
consistent pattern across types of office. In addition, even though
the effect of past campaign expenditures on government spending is
statistically significant for the state House regressions, the effect is
quite small economically. Specification 4 implies that a one standard
deviation change in campaign expenditures explains less than a half
of one percent of a standard deviation change in per capita state
government expenditures, while specification 1’s negative coefficient
implies that lagged campaign expenditures explains less than 10
percent. The evidence indicates that while some of the previous
specifications are consistent with past contributions increasing
government expenditures, this reverse causality is certainly not
prevalent enough to explain the results in all the previous regressions
linking increased government and campaign expenditures.
One final method of dealing with the causality issue is to run the
regressions on differences. Table 8 shows these results when the
explanation that it is the level of government expenditures which determine the
level of education expenditures.
14 When the term limit variable is included it affect is always negative but
insignificant. The results seem most consistent with Besley and Case’s (1995b)
findings that term limits either do not affect state government spending under
Republican governors or that when they do affect spending under Democratic
governors the net affect over a govvernor’s entire tenure in office is essentially
zero. While Crain and Oakley (1995) find a significant effect of term limits on
the level of state government capital expenditures, they do not examine the
question of total government expenditures. Wittman’s (1989, pp. 1409-1410)
political science survey provides an explanation for why term limits for
legislators might have different implications for government growth than term
limits for governors. He examines the literature that argues that legislators
favor government growth more than governors. If true, term limits on
governors would tend to weaken them relative to the legislatures and thus tend
to increase government spending, while term limits on legislators would tend
to do the reverse. Wittman’s arguments against these beliefs about the biases of
legislator and governors on spending may help explain these insignificant
results.
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changes in both per capita campaign expenditures and the natural
log of campaign expenditures are run on changes in the analogous
values of state government expenditures and the changes in per
capita income, the total number of candidates, and population. The
specifications were again run using the state House and Senate and
Gubernatorial data sets, and all the regressions continue to control
for both year and region dummies. The results consistently indicate
that changes in either state government expenditures or the total
number of candidates for the relevant office, and the effects of
government expenditures continue to be quite important
economically. For example, the coefficients that relate the change in
the log of campaign expenditures to the change in state government
expenditures imply that a one percentage point change in
government expenditures increases campaign expenditures by
between .77 and .94 of a percentage point.
The regression results from Tables 6, 7, and 8 thus help confirm
our hypothesis that higher government spending directly increases
campaign expenditures and provides evidence that the earlier
regressions were not simply picking up the reverse relationship. Even
if the causality runs from campaign spending to government
expenditures it cannot explain all the results.
VI. Is It the Composition of Expenditures
or Revenues that Matters?
If it is the size of government that determines how much effort
is spent competing for political office, do certain types of
expenditures draw more intense competition than others? One
might presume that at the margin politicians have allocated resources
so that the marginal intensity of feelings are equalized (Becker, 1976,
1983, and 1985 and Peltzman, 1976). For instance, increasing
educational expenditures by $10 per capita should not generate a
more intense response in terms of campaign expenditures than
would the same increase in highway construction. Yet, this empirical
result might not hold even if politicians do equate intensity of
feelings, since support and opposition can take many forms besides
campaign contributions. In addition, there may be other ways of
attempting to organize support or mitigate the opposition besides
using campaign expenditures. If one believes that politicians are

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

34

equating marginal support and opposition across all these margins,
the way to interpret any significant differences in results when the
composition of state government expenditures are broken down is as
a proxy for these left out measures of cost. The problem is further
complicated because some large areas of the state budgets are more
heavily subsidized through Federal transfers.
To examine this question, we broke down state government
expenditures into its four largest categories: education, highways,
welfare, and health. Likewise, revenues were broken down into
individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, sales taxes, and
property taxes. All the data were collected from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States.
Using the specifications shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5, twelve
regressions were run replacing either the natural log of state
expenditures or the per capita state expenditures with their analogous
versions of these four different components of expenditures and
eight more regressions were run replacing these measures of total
state expenditures. The specifications using the composition of
expenditures are reported in Tables 9, 10, and 11. The specifications
using different sources of tax revenue are not reported since virtually
all these coefficients had very low t-statistics.
Tables 9 and 11 show that larger educational expenditures are
most consistently associated with higher campaign expenditures in
state House and gubernatorial races, while all three tables usually
indicate that higher highway spending increases all three kinds of
state campaign expenditures. Table 10 provides evidence that higher
health care spending increases state senate campaign expenditures.
Some of the effects are quite large economically. Specifications 1 and
3 in Table 9 implies that a one standard deviation increase in per
capita educational expenditures can explain between 45 and 68
percent of a one standard deviation change in state House campaign
spending. The analogous numbers for highway expenditures are
much more variable, ranging from 5 to 72 percent. It is puzzling
why educational expenditures seem to be so important in explaining
state House and gubernatorial campaign expenditures and tend to
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have the opposite (though insignificant) effect on state senate
expenditures.15
These regressions might have been easier to decipher if they had
used data that predated the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision striking
down state rules that apportioned state House seats on the basis of
population and State Senate seats on the basis of geography, often
giving disproportionate electoral weight to more rural areas of a state
which might attach a greater weight to easy access to highways.
While regressions that use only one of the measures of expenditures
or taxes at a time provide statistically significant and positive results,
the high correlations between the different varaibles makes it harder
to ind significant positive relationships when all the variables are
used simultaneously. Yet, the bottom line seems to be that the total
level of expenditures are more consistently important in determining
campaign expenditures than are any particular components of those
expenditures or sources of those revenues.
VII. Does the Competition for Increased Government
Expenditures also Take the Form of Increasing the
Number of Candidates Who Run for Office?
Competition for resources can take many dimensions. While
interest groups are willing to spend more money to elect their
representatives as winning office becomes more valuable, they may
also compete by having more politicians run for office. As
government becomes larger, the attractiveness of becoming a
politician should increase. Using the variables we have already
employed to explain campaign expenditures, we can also attempt to
explain the number of candidates: does the number of legislative or
gubernatorial candidates increases with state government
expenditures? The regressions shown in Table 12 for the state
Houses, Senates, and Governorships attempt to control for: whether
incumbents are running in either the primary or general elections,
term limits, a state’s population and per capita income, and the
likelihood that the election will alter which party will control the
balance of power in their legislature or the state. The explanations
15

For a paper that atests to the strength of political influences in determining
the level of educational expenditures see Peltzman (1993) and Friedman (1993).
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for including these variables are similar to those described earlier,
with two exceptions: population and income. These are in part
included so as to provide continuity with the preceding regressions,
but, in addition, for a given number of seats a greater population may
provide a larger pool of potential candidates and if political
participation is a normal good, higher incomes could result in more
candidates running for office.
For the legislative races, we also control for the number of seats
that are up for election in each state. By contrast, since there is only
one gubernatorial election in any year, the intercept in the
gubernatorial regression is picking up this affect. We also reran the
legislative regressions by respecifying the endogenous variables as the
number of candidates divided by the number of seats up for election,
though none of the reported results were appreciable altered by this
respecification.16
The results in Table 12 suggest that there is no systematic
significant relationship between per capita state government
expenditures and the total number of candidates, and even when the
effect is significant for state Senate races it is relatively small: a one
standard deviation change in per capita income explains only 10
percent of a one standard deviation change in the total number of
candidates. Putting an additional state House or Senate seat up for
election produces slightly more than two new contestants. The most
consistent significant effects are whether there are incumbents
running in the Republican and Democratic primaries with the
legislative results implying that on average between 2 to 2.8 new
candidates enter for each incumbent who decides not to run for
reelection and the gubernatorial results imply that is range is
between 2.3 and 2.4. The insignificant results for the effect of
whether there is an incumbent in the general election may simply
result from the high degree of collinearity with the other two
measures of whether incumbents are running for reelection. More
lopsided control of a state legislature appears to discourage entry, but
the effects are insignificant.
16

Presumably, a more micro level data set that did not merely summarize the
legislative elections in each state but attempted to explain the number of
candidates in each race in each state might also attempt to control for the past
investments in political reputation made by individual candidates.
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Finally, there is one interesting result with respect to term limits.
Combining Table 11’s results with those reported earlier, there is
some weak evidence that legislative term limits reduce campaign
expenditures and increase the number of candidates running for
office. However, while the evidence that term limits reduce
expenditures is strongest for gubernatorial and Senate elections, the
evidence that they increase the number of candidates is strongest for
House elections. The negative effect of term limits on legislative
campaign expenditures might prove to be more significant once term
limits have been in place longer and more data has been acquired,
but the initial evidence is consistent with the notion that term limits
will reduce entry barriers in political markets.
VIII. Does the Competition for Increased Government
Expenditures also Take the form of Increasing the
Number of Terms that Politicians Remain in Office?
Competition for government resources might also take the form
of increasing legislator tenure. The longer incumbents stay in office,
the more they acquire skills that help them pass legislation (e.g.,
increased familiarity with legislative rules and procedures, acquisition
of seniority, and development of contacts and political favors
necessary for logrolling). A congressional district’s relative success in
creating transfers depends not only upon their representative’s stock
of skills but also his skills relative to other district’s representatives
(Dick and Lott, 1993, p. 6). This has important implications
relating government size and tenure. When government wealth
transfers are low the opportunity cost of removing a politician who
has acquired skills at creating transfers is also low. As the level of
transfers increases so to does the opportunity cost of removing a
relatively experienced representative (Dick and Lott, 1993, p. 13).
A simple measure of a congress’s expected tenure is the number
of terms congressmen who enter into congress during that year stay
in congress. To calculate this, entering congressmen were followed
over their next ten terms. While some congressmen did remain in
office for more than twenty years, using longer periods reduces the
number of observations. Using data from 1856 to 1992, the Pearson
correlations of .7286 and .9081 between either per capita or the
natural log of federal government expenditures and tenure imply a
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strong significant positive relationship. However, the plotted data in
Figure 4 is less persuasive. While tenure exhibits a continuous
upward trend over the entire period, government expenditures do
not indicate a similar relationship until the early 1930s. The definite
break in the data pattern shown for government expenditures does
not appear to coincide with any obvious changes in tenure.
Yet, there is still the question of whether there is a significant
relationship between tenure and government expenditures when
other variables are controlled for such as male life expectancy,
number of days that congress is in session, and real congressional
salaries or the relative salary of legislators to lawyers. The number of
days in session and salary data are used to measure the costs and
benefits to being in congress, while life expectancy can be
interpreted either in terms of opportunity costs or the physical limits
face to being in office. The data on life expectancy were obtained for
1900 to the present from Historical Statistics of the United States
and various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Data on the number of days congress was in session and salary
information were obtained either from Stigler (undated, Appendix
4) or a Nexis search of news articles on congressional salaries and
days in session. Congressional salaries and the number of days
congress is in session is available from 1856 to 1992, and the data on
law partners’ salaries is available from 1930 to 1978.17 Stigler (p. 11)
finds some evidence that the increases in tenure can be explained by
the relative salaries of congressmen and lawyers and a time trend.
Presumably the changing prices and time costs of transportation also
played an important role, but I was unable to find such indexes.
As Table 13 shows, the relationship between expenditures and
tenure is not significant when other variables are controlled for.
Specifications 1, 2, 4, and 5 are reported with only real congressional
salaries because law partner salaries were not available before 1930,
and specifications 1 and 3 are included exclude life expectancies
because those values are not available yearly before 1900. The
specifications also use both per capita and the natural log of federal
government expenditures.
17

Not having observation after 1978 is not a binding constraint on the
number of observations used in the regression because tenure requires ten terms
to calculate.
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Figure 4: Comparing the Change Over Time in Real
Per Capita Federal Expenditures with Expected
Tenure
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None of the government expenditure variables in any of the six
specifications are significant and the effect they imply are quite small
economically. For example using specification 4, a one standard
deviation change in per capita federal government expenditures
explains less than 10 percent of a standard deviation change in
tenure. Perhaps the table’s most interesting finding is that the time
trend is the only significant variable in four of the specifications and
in the other two specifications the only significant variable is male
life expectancy.
IX. Conclusion
Over the last couple of decades, most of the increase in campaign
expenditures can be explained by higher government spending. This
result holds for both Federal and state legislative campaigns and
gubernatorial races. The paper also finds that the level of
government expenditures more consistently predict higher campaign
expenditures than does either the composition of the expenditures or
the percentage of government revenue derived from different
revenue sources. While the competition for government transfers
seems to take the form higher campaign expenditures, there is little
evidence that it takes the form of increasing the number of
candidates running for office or lengthening term lengths.
The public policy debate presumes that all the supposed evils of
campaign finance would be simply solved by putting limits on
donations or on the total amount that candidates can spend. Yet, as
with other types of controls, one risks merely changing the form of
payments rather than really restricting the level of payments. The
debate unfortunately focuses on the symptoms and not the root
causes of the ever higher expenditures. This paper suggests that if
one really wants to reduce the resources society spends on campaigns,
the solution is to make the government smaller.The paper also
provides some weak evidence that legislative term limits reduce
campaign expenditures and increase the number of candidates
running for office.
However, just as with the concerns that we have raised over
reducing campaign expenditures through placing spending limits,
there are difficulties inherent in limiting government spending. For
example, preventing transfers from taking the form of budget
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expenditures may simply make them take other forms like
regulations. There is also the concern that these new methods of
transfers will involve greater deadweight losses than their previous
forms (Coate and Morris, 1995 and Lott, 1996).
Understanding the cause of increased campaign expenditures also
puts into perspective the claim that campaign expenditures are “too
large.” The real puzzle should actually be: why are campaign
expenditures so small when there is so much money at stake? Why
are Federal budget expenditures 2500 times larger than total Federal
legislative campaign expenditures and State budget expenditures
1250 times larger than total state legislative campaign expenditures?
Possibly, government expenditures produce few rents or that the
expenditures are taking many other forms. If this last point is true,
the question then becomes: why is it preferable that the rent-seeking
primarily take forms other than campaign contributions, or does it
matter? Alternatively, it just might be extremely costly to produce
the what rents the government produces.
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Data Appendix: List of Sources
Gubernatorial Election Data
Total campaign expenditures (in 1992 $) by candidates for
primaries, runoffs, and general elections were obtained from The
Book of the States 1994-1995 and earlier years.
Total state expenditures (in 1992 $) were obtained from either
the Statistical Abstract of the U. S. or the World Almanac and Book of
Facts.
Per capita income of state residents (in 1992 $) were obtained
from various years of the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Total state taxes (in 1992 $) were obtained from the Statistical
Abstract of the U. S..
The variable for whether there is an incumbent in the race takes
the value of 1 if the incumbent entered the race and a value of 0 if
the incumbent was not a candidate (Sources: 1990-1992 data taken
from The Book of the States 1994-1995, p. 39; 1986-1989 data
taken from The Book of the States 1990-1991, p. 52; and
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U. S. Elections, Third Edition, pp.
667-773).
The absolute margin of control in the State Senate and House
of Representatives: Offices that were either vacant or occupied by an
independent were not counted in either the numerator or the
denominator. The source for this was the World Almanac and Book
of Facts.
The dummy variable for whether the control of the state
legislatures is split takes the value of 1 if there is split control of the
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Legislature and the Senate in a given and year. Missing values were
assigned to Nebraska for all years, because it has a unicameral
legislature of 49 members who are elected on a nonpartisan ballot.
The source for this was the World Almanac and Book of Facts.
The length of a governor’s term (in years) is obtained from The
Book of the States 1978-1995, Tables entitled “The Governors.”
The maximum number of consecutive years that a governor may
serve were also obtained from The Book of the States 1978-1995, and
from Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U. S. Elections, Third
Edition, p. 635. An entry of 0 means that there is no limit. Between
1978 and 1992 six states (California, Colorado, Hawaii, New
Mexico (1991), South Carolina, and Tennessee) changed their
policies regarding the maximum number of consecutive years that a
governor could serve. Since our election data only go through 1990
for New Mexico its change will not be observed in our sample.
A term limit dummy variable takes the value of 1 if there is a
limit on the number of consecutive terms a governor may serve and
takes the value of 0 if there is no such limit. Between 1978 and 1992
three states (California, Colorado, and Hawaii) introduced a term
limit for governors. During this period three other states (New
Mexico, South Carolina, and Tennessee) increased from one to two
the number of consecutive terms that a governor could serve. This is
obtained from The Book of the States 1978-1995, and from
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U. S. Elections, Third Edition, p.
635. An entry of 0 means that there is no limit.
The dummy variable for whether there is an incumbent in the
general election takes on the value of 1 if there was an incumbent in
the general election and a 0 if an incumbent was not in the general
election. (Sources: 1990-1992 data taken from The Book of the States
1994-1995, p. 39. For 1986-1989, the data is taken from The Book of
the States 1990-1991, p. 52.)
The absolute margin of victory in the general election was
calculated as the difference in the percentage of votes between the
top two candidates in the race. The sources for this data are The
Book of the States and The Almanac of American Politics which was
used for the elections in which third party or independent candidates
finished in the top two in the general election.
The number of candidates in the general election that received
more than 5% of the vote was obtained from Congressional
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Quarterly’s Guide to U. S. Elections, Third Edition, pp. 667-716.
The data for Louisiana is omitted from this variable because of its
open primary system.
The variables for whether there was an incumbent in the
Republican or Democratic primaries, the absolute margin of victory
between the top two contestants in those primaries, the number of
candidates with over 5 percent of the vote in those primaries, and
information on whether those primaries were uncontested were all
obtained from Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U. S. Elections
(third edition).
In Connecticut, party conventions nominate candidates by
convention. However, if an individual receives at least 20% of the
convention vote, then he is allowed to petition for a challenge
primary. Only in 1986 was there a Republican challenge primary.
For the other years the dummy for whether the primary was
contested was set equal to 1 and the margin of victory in the primary
was set equal to 100, thus interpreting the lack of a challenge to
imply that the convention was uncontested.
In Delaware, party conventions nominate candidates by
convention. However, if an individual receives at least 35% of the
convention vote, then he is allowed to petition for a challenge
primary. Challenge primaries occurred in 1980, 1984, 1988 and
1992. However, only in 1992 did someone not receive 100% of the
primary votes. Therefore, the dummy for whether the primary was
contested was set equal to 1 and the margin of victory in the primary
was set equal to 100 for all years except 1992.
Utah had Republican and Democratic primaries in 1976, 1984
and 1992. In 1980 and 1988 it had conventions for both parties.
Virginia had a Republican primary in 1989 and a Democratic
primary in 1977. For all other years there were conventions. For
these convention observations no values were assigned to the data.
Louisiana’s values were ommitted for all years, because it has a nonpartisan open primary that requires all candidates, regardless of party
affiliation, to appear on a single ballot.
State Legislative Election Expenditures
Primary and general election information on vote margins,
number of seats up for election, percent of seats with no challengers
or incumbents, the total number of candidates, campaign
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expenditure information were obtained from the following sources.
The information was collected by first writing to the state Secretary
of State offices and state election commissions and then following
up with telephone calls.
Alabama
Printed information for 1990 was obtained from Alabama’s
Secretary of State Jim Bennett’s office.
Alaska
Primary Election Results
Alaska Secretary of State, State of Alaska Official Returns by
Election Precinct Primary Election August 22, 1978; August 27, 1980;
August 24, 1982; August 28, 1984; August 26, 1986; August 23,
1988; August 28, 1990; September 8, 1992.
General Election Results
Alaska Secretary of State, State of Alaska Official Returns by
Election Precinct General Election November 5, 1978; November 7,
1980; November 2, 1982; November 6, 1984; November 4, 1986;
November 8, 1988; November 6, 1990; November 3, 1992.
Campaign expenditures for the annual report of the State
Election Commission from 1974 to 1992. Name changed from state
election to Alaska Public Offices Commission.
California
Primary Election Results
California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement
Primary Eleciton, June 6, 1978; June 5, 1984; and June 3, 1986.
Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1978; June 5, 1980; June 9, 1982; June
10, 1982; June 9, 1988; June 7, 1990; and June 4, 1992.
General Election Results
California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement
General Election November 7, 1978
California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote General Election
November 4, 1980; November 2, 1982; November 6, 1984;
November 4, 1986; November 8, 1988; November 6, 1990, General
Election; and November 3, 1992, General Election
Campaign expenditures are obtained from Fay, James S., editor,
California Journal (6th edition), Santa Barbara, Ca. (1994): 199.
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Connecticut
Primary Election Results
State of Connecticut Office of the Secretary of State Elections
Services Division, Statement of Vote, September 14, 1988; September
11, 1990; and September 15, 1992.
General Election Results
State of Connecticut Secretary of the State, Statement of Vote
General Election November 8, 1988; November 6, 1990; and
November 3, 1992
Campaign expenditure information is contained separately on
photocopied sheets from the secretary of state’s office.
Florida
Primary Election Results
Florida Department of State Division of Elections, Tabulation of
Official Votes Florida Primary Elections Democratic, Republican and
Nopartisan September 12, 1978 and October 5, 1978; September 9,
1980 and October 7, 1980; September 7, 1982 and October 5, 1982;
September 4, 1984 and October 2, 1984; September 2, 1986 and
September 30, 1986; September 6, 1988 and October 4, 1988;
September 4, 1990 and October 2, 1990; and September 1, 1992 and
October 1, 1992.
General Election Results
Florida Department of State Division of Elections, Tabulation of
Official Votes Florida General Election; November 7, 1978;
November 4, 1980; November 6, 1984; November 4, 1986;
November 8, 1988; November 6, 1990; and November 3, 1992
Campaign expenditure information is contained separately on
photocopied sheets from the State Division of Elections’ office.
Idaho
Primary Election Results
Idaho Secretary of State, Official Vote Totals Primary Election May 27, 1986; May 24, 1988; May 22, 1990; and the Idaho
Secretary of State, Legislative District Totals 1992 Primary Election.
General Election Results
Idaho Secretary of State, Official Vote Totals/Legislative
Districts General Election - November 4, 1986; also November 8,
1988; November 6, 1990; and November 3, 1992.
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Campaign expenditure information is contained separately on
photocopied sheets from the secretary of state’s office.
Kansas
Primary and General Election Results: Kansas Secretary of State,
Election Statistics State of Kansas 1982 Primary and General
Elections (the analogous publications for 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,
and 1992 were also used).
Campaign expenditure information is contained separately on
photocopied sheets from the secretary of state’s office.
Michigan
Primary Election Results: Michigan Department of State, State
of Michigan Official Canvass of Votes Primary Election August 8,
1978 Special Elections General Election November 7, 1978; August 5,
1980; August 10, 1982; August 7, 1984; August 5, 1986; August 2,
1988; August 7, 1990; and August 4, 1992.
General Election Results
Michigan Department of State, Official Canvass of Votes,
General Eleciton 1978; November 4, 1980; November 2, 1982;
November 6, 1984; November 4, 1986; November 8, 1988;
November 6, 1990; and November 3, 1992
Campaign expenditure information is obtained from various
issues of Michigan Election Statistics.
Missouri
Primary and General Election Results
Missouri Secretary of State, Certified Totals of the Missouri
Primary Election August 7, 1990; Roster 1977-1978 State, District
and County Officers State of Missouri; 1979-1980 Roster State,
District, County Officers State of Missouri; 1981-1982 Roster State,
District, County Officers State of Missouri; 1983-1984 Roster State,
District, County Officers State of Missouri; 1985-1986 Roster of State,
District and County Officials--State of Missouri; Missouri Roster
1987-1988 A Directory of State, District and County Officials;
Missouri Roster 1991-1992 A Directory of State, District and County
Officials; 1978 Missouri Annual Campaign Finance Report (Jefferson
City, 1979) similar reports for 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,
1992.
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Ohio
Primary and General Election Results and Campaign
Expenditures
Ohio Secretary of State, Ohio Election Statistics for 1989-1990
and for 1991-1992.
Oregon
Summary Report of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures,
Secretary of State Elections Division, 1992 General Election and
Oregon Secretary of State, Oregon Election Statistics for 1972-93.
North Carolina
State of North Carolina, State Board of Elections, Abstract of
Votes cast for state representatives and state senators for primary and
general election races in 1990 and 1992. Aso the biyearly Elections for
State Senate in Multi county districts, Analysis of Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures.
Washington
Primary Election Results
Washington Secretary of State, State of Washington 1978
Abstract of Votes Primary & General Election Held September 19 and
November 7, analogous listing for 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988.
Washington Secretary of State, State of Washington Official Returns
of the State Primary Held On September 18, 1990. Washington
Secretary of State, Official Returns of the Washington State Primary
September 15, 1992
General Election Results
Washington Secretary of State, Official Returns of the State
General Election November 3, 1992 State of Washington; Washington
State Public Disclosure Commission, 1978 Election Financing Fact
Book (Olympia, 1979, and related publications for 1981, 1985, 1989,
1991, 1993).
Other Data
Federal and state data on per capita income, population, state
government expenditures and the breakdown of those expenditures
by type were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States.
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Campaign Expenditures

Total Federal campaign expenditures for the House and Senate
and the total number of candidates for those offices were obtained
from press releases put out by the Federal Election Commission.
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Table 1: Changes in Campaign Spending Over Time
A) Comparing the Real Per Capita Increases in Campaign Expenditures for All Candidates Who Ran for a State’s House or
Senate (The comparisons in this table are made only for those states where data covering at least 4 election cycles are
available.)

Election Cycles
Covering Years from

Percent Change in
Real Per Capita
Expenditures for State
House and Senate
Races

Comparison Over the
Same Period for Real
Per Capita Increases in
National Advertising in
the U.S.

Alaska

1976-92

29.3

84.6

137.5

California

1976-92

25.2

84.6

137.5

Florida

1978-92

44.5

63.4

41.5

Idaho

1976-92

45.8

84.6

137.5

Kansas

1982-92

26.0

73.2

24.4

Massachusetts

1986-92

30.2

14.1

10.9

Michigan

1978-92

101.0

63.4

41.5

Missouri

1978-90

22.1

70.98

2.4

Oregon

1972-92

185.0

…

111.0

84.6

State

for comparison only
*

1976-92

Federal campaign expenditures are not available prior to 1976.
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Comparison Over the Same
Period for Real Per Capita
Increases in Federal Senate
and House Races*

…
137.5

Washington

1978-92

100.0
54.4**

Average
Percentage Increase 1976-94

63.4

41.5

68.7

71.2

113.7

136.0

B) Real Per Capita Increases in Campaign Expenditures for All Candidates Who Ran for a State’s Governorship (Arkansas,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont have observations that occur in both the first two sets of states.)

States with Elections during:

Percent Change in Real
Per Capita Expenditures

Number of States

1) 1982, 1986, 1990

58.0

36

2) 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992

61.8

13 during 1980 and 1984, 12 during 1988 and 1992
(Change due to Arkansas switching to four year term)

3) 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989

137.0

2 (New Jersey and Virginia)

4) 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991

11.0

3 (Louisiana, Kentucky, and Mississippi)

**

This average uses the 1976 to 1992 period for Oregon.
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Table 2: Sample Means and Standard Deviations
(All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses and the number of observations are listed
below that. The column entitled “All State Legislative Campaigns” sums up the campaign expenditure data for State Senate
and House races when data for both races are available for a particular year in a state.)
Data Description
Federal
Legislative
Campaigns

All State
Legislative
Campaigns

State Senate
Legislative
Campaigns

State House
Legislative
Campaigns

Gubernatorial
Campaign
Expenditures

20.001
(0.299)
10

15.93
(1.009)
81

14.72
(1.100)
81

15.26
(1.086)
91

15.47
(1.067)
178

Per Capita

2.09

2.78

0.903

1.51

2.575

Campaign

(0.4524)

(2.60)

(0.9896)

(1.566)

(2.509)

Expenditures

10

81

81

91

178

Ln (Federal
Budget
Expenditures)

27.785
(0.151)
10

...

...

...

...

Ln (State Budget
Expenditures)

...

23.02
(0.969)
81

23.02
(0.969)
81

16.07
(0.9892)
91

22.49
(0.9506)
178

Per Capita Federal
Budget
Expenditures

4922
(452.8)
10

...

...

...

...

Variable
Descriptions
Ln (Campaign
Expenditures)
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Data Description
Federal
Legislative
Campaigns

All State
Legislative
Campaigns

State Senate
Legislative
Campaigns

State House
Legislative
Campaigns

Gubernatorial
Campaign
Expenditures

Per Capita State
Budget
Expenditures

...

2945
(2226)
81

2945
(2226)
81

2894.88
(2131.26)
91

2290.93
(1102.11)
178

% Difference in
Representation
Between Major
Parties

...

...

0.253(0.168) 81

0.265(0.1596) 91

...

Total Number of
Candidates

2014.9
(523.7)
10

275
(87.6)
61

59.45
(28.41)
61

249
(84.32)
69

4.565
(1.69)
168

238,188,600
(14,153,412)
10

6,902,488
(7,595,000)
81

6,902,488
(7,595,000)
81

6,685,681
(7,355,442)
91

4,402,343
(4,858,034)
178

Variable
Descriptions

Population
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Table 3: Explaining Total Campaign Expenditures for State House Races
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)
Exogenous Variables
Ln (State Expenditures)
Per Capita State Expenditures

(1)

(2)

0.7805
(4.67)

0.6675
(5.94)

...

...

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population
(3)
...

(4)
...

0.000619
(3.08)

0.000726
(7.39)

Per Capita Income

1.6 E-5
(0.48)

6.81 E-5
(1.94)

2.06 E-5
(0.34)

4.69 E-5
(1.03)

Term Limits

-0.1540(1.06)

-0.1278(0.78)

-0.3012(1.28)

-0.3136(1.48)

Abs % Difference in Control of
State House

0.1568
(0.39)

-0.4175
(1.14)

0.1730
(0.26)

0.6283
(1.44)

-0.00155
(1.57)

...

-0.00198
(1.64)

Total Number of Candidates
Running for the State House
Population

...
6.0 E-8
(3.69)

3.9 E-8
(2.93)
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5.1 E-8
(3.31)

9.1 E-9
(1.06)

Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population
(3)

(4)

House General Election
Variables
Number of Seats Up for
Election

-0.0027
(0.01)

...

0.00446
(0.81)

...

%Seats with No Challenger

0.1292
(0.16)

...

1.7158
(1.43)

...

%Seats with No Incumbent

-0.5306
(0.60)

...

-1.4366
(1.05)

...

%Seats with Multiple Inc.

-4.4966
(0.94)

...

-7.8326
(1.03)

...

%Seats Won by between 0 and
5%-General

5.092
(3.82)

...

4.8882
(2.28)

...

%Seats Won by between 5 and
10% -General

1.8177
(1.43)

...

3.3914
(1.69)

...

%Seats Won by between 10
and 15% -General

1.4806
(1.00)

...

3.2958
(1.38)

...

%Seats Won by between 15
and 20%-General

-0.3688
(0.29)

...

0.7441
(0.38)

...
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population
(3)

(4)

Republican House Primary
Variables
Rep. Prim. Candidates/Seats

0.2806
(0.73)

...

-0.0246
(0.04)

...

R%Seats with NoChal

1.5323
(3.04)

...

1.8022
(2.18)

...

R%Seats with NoInc

-0.4879
(0.74)

...

-0.2855
(0.26)

...

R%Seats with MultInc

-1.5118
(0.23)

...

13.8445
(1.14)

...

R%Seats Won by between 0
and 5%-Primary

-0.0020
(0.00)

...

-2.0368
(0.55)

...

R%Seats Won by between 5
and 10% -Primary

2.9803
(1.17)

...

6.7109
(1.71)

...

R%Seats Won by between 10
and 15% -Primary

-2.4726
(0.90)

...

0.4886
(0.10)

...

R%Seats Won by between 15
and 20%-Primary

-4.2963
(1.88)

...

-0.2717
(0.07)

...

61

Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population
(3)

(4)

Democratic House Primary
Variables
Dem. Prim. Candidates/Seats

-0.5048
(1.32)

...

-0.5197
(0.95)

...

D%Seats with No Chal.

-1.0294
(2.06)

...

-0.4760
(0.59)

...

D%Seats with No Inc

1.3720
(1.72)

...

2.2221
(1.84)

...

D%Seats with Multiple Inc

-1.1947
(0.19)

...

-2.0802
(0.22)

...

D%Seats Won by between 0
and 5%-Primary

1.4223
(0.68)

...

-0.5382
(0.16)

...

D%Seats Won by between 5
and 10% -Primary

-3.5151
(1.35)

...

-0.6209
(0.16)

...

D%Seats Won by between 10
and 15% -Primary

1.7311
(0.66)

...

3.06
(0.74)

...

D%Seats Won by between 15
and 20%-Primary

2.9682
(1.03)

...

4.7755
(1.05)

...
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)
Exogenous Variables

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population

(1)

(2)

Intercept

0.4952
(0.17)

2.9215
(1.54)

-5.0339
(2.31)

Adj-R2=

0.8921

0.9317

0.8847

0.9555

Root Mean Sq Error

0.1997

0.2811

0.3231

0.3624

Observations

69.0

69.0
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(3)

69.0

(4)
-2.067
(1.79)

69.0

Table 4: Explaining Total Campaign Expenditures for State Senate Races
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)
Exogenous Variables
Ln (State Expenditures)
Per Capita State Expenditures

(1)
0.5882
(2.71)

(2)
0.8656
(6.18)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population
(3)

(4)

...

...

...

...

0.000367
(3.71)

0.000304
(3.57)

Per Capita Income

4.7 E-5
(1.39)

4.36 E-5
(1.63)

2.38 E-5
(1.04)

1.1 E-5
(0.47)

Term Limits

-0.3639
(1.51)

-0.2659
(1.42)

-0.3675
(2.10)

-0.1772
(1.13)

Abs % Difference in Control of
State Senate

-0.1183
(0.21)

-0.789
(2.50)

-0.5589
(1.55)

0.0102
(0.03)

...

0.0106
(4.92)

...

0.00343
(1.83)

4.6 E-8
(1.87)

7.6 E-9
(0.48)

4.4 E-9
(0.57)

3.5 E-9
(0.60)

Total Number of Candidates
Running for the State Senate
Population
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population
(3)

(4)

Senate General Election
Variables
Number of Seats Up for
Election

0.01336
(1.53)

...

0.0067
(1.16)

...

%Seats with No Challenger

0.6806
(2.82)

...

0.4751
(2.76)

...

%Seats with No Incumbent

-0.40(0.58)93

...

0.5335
(1.08)

...

%Seats with Multiple Inc.

-0.8345
(0.55)

...

-2.020
(1.79)

...

%Seats Won by between 0 and
5%-General

1.5722
(1.47)

...

0.3312
(0.42)

...

%Seats Won by between 5 and
10% -General

0.5732
(0.64)

...

0.3317
(0.52)

...

%Seats Won by between 10
and 15% -General

0.7331
(0.74)

...

1.045
(1.46)

...

%Seats Won by between15 and
20%-General

0.6956
(0.62)

...

-1.041
(1.23)

...
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)
Exogenous Variables

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Rep. Prim. Candidates/Seats

-0.1040
(0.27)

...

-0.813
(2.99)

...

R%Seats with NoChal

-0.1660
(0.31)

...

0.3281
(0.86)

...

R%Seats with NoInc

1.1482
(1.57)

...

1.2455
(2.42)

...

R%Seats with MultInc

-7.1267
(2.34)

R%Seats Won by between 0
and 5%-Primary

1.5012
(0.73)

...

-0.6295
(0.45)

...

R%Seats Won by between 5
and 10% -Primary

0.5491
(0.28)

...

0.2066
(0.16)

...

R%Seats Won by between 10
and 15% -Primary

-0.9974
(0.61)

...

-1.6711
(1.38)

...

Republican Senate Primary
Variables

-6.5598
(3.09)
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)
Exogenous Variables

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.5868
(0.23)

...

3.4809
(1.99)

...

Dem. Prim. Candidates/Seats

0.555
(1.54)

...

0.5346
(2.60)

...

D%Seats with No Chal.

-0.191
(0.25)

...

0.1785
(0.44)

...

D%Seats with No Inc

1.189
(1.32)

...

1.7285
(3.52)

...

D%Seats with Multiple Inc

0.004
(0.00)

...

3.7506
(2.00)

...

D%Seats Won by between 0
and 5%-Primary

-0.311
(0.12)

...

-2.2827
(1.32)

...

D%Seats Won by between 5
and 10% -Primary

-1.711
(0.79)

...

-2.6399
(2.06)

...

D%Seats Won by between 10
and 15% -Primary

-1.405
(0.86)

...

0.1175
(0.11)

...

R%Seats Won by between 15
and 20%-Primary
Democratic Primary Senate
Variables
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population

(2)

(3)

(4)

D%Seats Won by between 15
and 20%-Primary

0.248
(0.11)

...

-0.5374
(0.38)

...

Intercept

-3.1736
(0.68)

-7.1973
(2.31)

-3.2262
(4.33)

-0.7706
(1.58)

R 2=

0.8712

0.8941

0.8871

0.9316

Root Mean Sq Error

0.2847

0.3482

0.2016

0.2878

Observations

61.0

61.0
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61.0

61.0

Table 5: Explaining Total Campaign Expenditures for Gubernatorial Races
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

Ln (State Expenditures)
Per Capita State Expenditures
Per Capita Income
No Incumbent Running

(2)

0.6020
(5.418)

0.7551
(6.377)

...

...

0.000029
(1.214)
...

2.24 E-6
(0.086)

(Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)/Population
(3)

(4)

...

...

0.00157
(5.091)

0.001463
(5.111)

1.54 E-5
(0.242)

-.0000157
(0.246)

0.3877
(3.761)

...

0.6619
(2.545)

Maximum Number of Years
Governor allowed to Serve

0.02625
(2.035)

0.0223
(1.585)

0.1027
(2.709)

0.0961
(2.653)

Length of Term

0.01407
(0.163)

0.0677
(0.733)

0.4845
(2.209)

0.4527
(2.150)

Split Control of State
Legislature

0.0366
(0.286)

-0.1752
(1.269)

-0.2797
(0.773)

-0.6399
(1.842)
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

(Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)/Population
(3)

(4)

Abs % Difference in Control of
State Senate

0.6580
(2.601)

...

1.1859
(1.660)

...

Abs % Difference in Control of
State House

-0.2878
(1.100)

...

-0.8142
(1.123)

...

...

0.1260
(3.664)

...

0.2371
(2.746)

Total Number of Major Party
Candidates Running for the
Governorship
Population

3.04 E-8
(1.681)

1.43 E-8
(0.722)

-4.20 E-8
(1.447)

-3.79 E-8
(1.345)

General Election Variables
Incumbent in General Election

0.2360
(0.752)

...

-0.0678
(0.076)

Winning Margin in General
Election Between Top Two
Candidates

-0.0168
(4.664)

...

-0.0223
(2.202)

...

Number of Candidates with
more than 5 percent of Vote

0.0058
(0.041)

...

0.0992
(0.249)

...
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...

Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)
Exogenous Variables

(Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)/Population

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Republican Incumbent

-0.3238
(0.979)

...

-0.2561
(0.273)

...

No Challenger

0.0004
(0.003)

...

-0.0459
(0.111)

...

Winning Margin in General
Election Between Top Two
Candidates

-0.0046
(2.250)

...

-0.0067
(1.150)

...

Number of Candidates with
more than 5 percent of Vote

-0.0582
(0.937)

...

-0.1510
(0.853)

...

Democratic Incumbent

-0.4797
(1.598)

...

-0.3414
(0.402)

...

No Challenger

0.2483
(1.484)

...

0.6483
(1.343)

...

Republican Gubernatorial
Primary Variables

Democratic Gubernatorial
Primary Variables
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)
Exogenous Variables

(Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)/Population

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Winning Margin in General
Election Between Top Two
Candidates

-0.005
(2.230)

...

-0.0079
(1.249)

...

Number of Candidates with
more than 5 percent of Vote

0.0967
(1.467)

...

0.3725
(2.002)

...

Intercept

1.5479
(0.676)

-2.4545
(1.025)

-0.6881
(0.342)

-1.4676
(0.897)

Adj-R2 =

0.7837

0.7114

0.6877

0.6668

Root Mean Sq Error

0.4984

0.5757

1.4066

1.4527

Observations

164.0

164.0
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164.0

164.0

Table 6: To What Extent are Government Expenditures Proxying for Past Campaign Expenditures?
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
(Total Campaign Spending)/Population for
Ln (Total Campaign Spending) for
House
Exogenous Variables

(1)

State

Governor

(2)

(3)

House
(4)

State
(5)

Governor
(6)

Ln (State Expenditures)

0.5530
(2.852)

0.6737
(3.750)

0.7870
(7.357)

...

...

...

Lagged Ln(Campaign
Expenditures)

0.6795
(4.827)

0.4696
(3.588)

0.4225
(6.782)

...

...

...

Per Capita State Expenditures

...

...

...

0.00068
(5.465)

0.00026
(1.962)

0.001296
(7.897)

Lagged Per Capita Campaign
Expenditures

...

...

...

0.0650
(1.530)

0.2036
(1.378)

0.31497
(4.956)

-3.7 E-5
(1.571)

9.2 E-5
(1.580)

-3.42 E-6
(0.246)

-1.03 E-4
(1.877)

Per Capita Income
No Incumbent Running

Term Limits

5.4 E-5
(1.451)

2.06 E-6
(0.066)

...

...

0.0373
(0.326)

...

...

0.1697
(0.646)

-0.0752

-0.3527

...

-0.2524

-0.3277

...
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Dependent Variables
(Total Campaign Spending)/Population for
Ln (Total Campaign Spending) for
House
Exogenous Variables

(1)
(0.486)

State

Governor

(2)
(1.750)

(3)

House
(4)

State
(5)

Governor
(6)

(1.041)

(1.542)

Maximum Number of Years
Governor allowed to Serve

...

...

0.0247
(1.872)

...

...

0.0779
(2.335)

Length of Term

...

...

-0.1463
(1.667)

...

...

-0.6554
(3.470)

Abs % Difference in Control of
State House

0.0561
(0.166)

...

...

0.7169
(1.559)

...

...

Abs % Difference in Control of
State Senate

...

-0.0788
(0.186)

...

...

-0.2521
(0.572)

...

Split Control of State
Legislature

...

...

-0.1772
(1.460)

...

...

-0.3497
(1.127)

Total Number of Major Party
Candidates Running

0.0005
(0.459)

0.0054
(2.027)

0.09246
(2.749)

-0.00286
(1.952)

0.0017
(0.685)

0.3130
(3.792)

Population

-2.83 E-10
(0.019)

1.65 E-8
(1.131)

1.81 E-8
(1.051)

-4.37 E-9
(1.447)

2.36 E-10
(0.030)

-2.19 E-8
(0.893)

2.4545

1.5286

3.0850

Intercept

1.0831
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1.282

1.381

Dependent Variables
(Total Campaign Spending)/Population for
Ln (Total Campaign Spending) for
House
Exogenous Variables

State

Governor

(1)
(0.569)

(2)
(1.025)

(3)
(0.688)

Adj-R2 =

0.9539

0.9309

Root Mean Sq Error

0.2380

0.2928

Observations

61.0

53.0

(4)

State
(5)

Governor

(2.087)

(0.162)

(6)
(0.754)

0.8319

0.9578

0.9320

0.7599

0.4362

0.3668

0.2991

1.0726

118.0

75

House

61.0

53.0

118.0

Table 7: Do Lagged Campaign Expenditures Explain Higher Government Expenditures?
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Government Spending) for

Exogenous Variables
Lagged Ln (State
Expenditures)

House

Senate

Governor

House

Senate

Governor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.9300

0.8688

0.9831

...

...

...

(21.94)
Lagged Ln(Campaign
Expenditures)
Lagged Per Capita State
Expenditures

(Total Government Spending)/Population
for

(15.92)

(50.353)

-0.0877
(20.32)

0.5291
(2.16)

0.0023
(0.223)

...

...

...

...

...

...

0.5066

0.5577

0.8636

(9.58)
Lagged Per Capita Campaign
Expenditures
Per Capita Income
Population

...

...

...

0.2052

(6.18)
-237.58

(29.208)
-13.44

(3.39)

(1.76)

(1.160)

5.4 E-5
(4.21)

1.70 E-4
(1.83)

1.32 E-5
(2.948)

0.1339
(4.23)

0.12998
(4.89)

0.0155
(1.605)

1.2 E-8

-5.7 E-8

2.49 E-9

-1.5 E-5

-1.2 E-5

-3.24 E-6
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Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Government Spending) for

Exogenous Variables
Intercept

House

Senate

Governor

House

Senate

Governor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(2.53)

(1.83)

(0.707)

(2.08)

(1.94)

(0.754)

0.2833

-1361.69

-1137.46

68.3759

(0.649)

(1.70)

(1.85)

(0.293)

1.2351
(2.08)

Adj-R2 =
Observations =

(Total Government Spending)/Population
for

0.9810
75.0

-8.1352
(2.36)
0.9358

0.9907

64.0

128.0

77

0.9687
75.0

0.9696
64.0

0.9604
128.0

Table 8: Rerunning the Regressions Using Differences.
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Change in (Total Campaign Spending)/
Population

Exogenous Variables
Change in Per Capita State
Expenditures)
Change in Ln (State Expenditures)

Change in Ln (Total Campaign Spending)

House

Senate

Governor

House

Senate

Governor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.00096
(8.389)

0.00043
(2.861)

...

...

...

0.7698
(2.822)

0.9096
(1.864)

0.9385
(2.064)

...

0.001004
(4.040)

...

...

Change in Per Capita Income

-4.05 E-6
(0.134)

0.000018
(0.533)

2.4 E-5
(0.256)

6.82 E-6
(0.417)

0.000028
(1.047)

0.00001
(0.244)

Change in the Total Number of
Candidates

0.0017
(1.611)

0.0083
(1.989)

0.00471
(3.595)

0.00276
(4.103)

0.0112
(3.270)

0.0227
(3.940)

Change in Population

-2.21 E-7
(1.483)

-9.04 E-8
(0.554)

6.85 E-9
(0.170)

-1.68 E-7
(2.076)

-1.53 E-7
(1.232)

-1.63 E-9
(0.754)

Intercept

-0.4669
(1.824)

-0.1015
(0.477)

-0.5867
(0.669)

-0.1956
(1.383)

0.0325
(0.181)

-0.3519
(0.941)

Adj-R2 =

0.5759

0.2230

0.1513

0.3088

0.2839

0.0603

Observations =

58.0

50.0

121.0

78

58.0

50.0

121.0

Table 9: Explaining Total Campaign Expenditures by Type of State Spending:
Expenditures for All Candidates Running for the State Houses
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. Year and regional dummy variables are not reported.
Specifications 1 and 3 do not show the coefficients for the vector of variables that control for the number
of candidates and the closeness of races in the general and primary elections. This is the same set of
control variables used in specifications 1 and 3 in Table 3. Specifications 2 and 4 use the same set of
control variables that were employed in specifications 2 and 4 in Table 3. Again the results for these
other variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population

Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

Ln (State Education
Expenditures)

0.7155
(2.16)

0.4754
(2.11)

...

...

Ln (State Highway
Expenditures)

0.0758
(0.18)

-0.4285
(1.56)

...

...

Ln (State Welfare
Expenditures)

-0.1649
(0.73)

0.2625
(1.52)

...

...

Ln (State Health Expenditures)

-0.0027
(0.02)

0.1375
(1.42)

...

...

...

...

0.0014
(1.96)

0.0013
(2.91)

Per Capita State Education
Expenditures
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(3)

(4)

Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
House)/Population

Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

Per Capita State Highway
Expenditures

...

...

0.00488
(3.12)

0.0033
(3.74)

Per Capita State Welfare
Expenditures

...

...

-0.0023
(1.08)

-0.00011
(0.13)

Per Capita State Health
Expenditures

...

...

0.0000134
(0.04)

0.00028
(1.14)

Intercept

-0.4209
(0.08)

4.070
(1.23)

-6.9511
(2.10)

-2.3179
(1.29)

Adj-R2 =

0.8823

0.8117

0.8289

0.8128

Root Mean Sq Error

0.2270

0.2757

0.4733

0.5196

Observations

69.0

69.0

80

(3)

69.0

(4)

69.0

Table 10: Explaining Total Campaign Expenditures by Type of State Spending:
Expenditures for All Candidates Running for the State Senates
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. Year and regional dummy variables are not reported.
Specifications 1 and 3 do not show the coefficients for the vector of variables that control for the number
of candidates and the closeness of races in the general and primary elections. This is the same set of
control variables used in specifications 1 and 3 in Table 4. Specifications 2 and 4 use the same set of
control variables that were employed in specifications 2 and 4 in Table 4. Again the results for these
other variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

Ln (State Education
Expenditures)

-0.2076
(0.49)

-0.4309
(1.32)

...

...

Ln (State Highway
Expenditures)

0.8878
(1.67)

1.1276
(2.75)

...

...

Ln (State Welfare
Expenditures)

-0.1202
(0.39)

0.0322
(0.13)

...

...

Ln (State Health Expenditures)

0.2419
(1.69)

0.2316
(1.83)

...

...

...

...

-0.0001
(0.30)

Per Capita State Education
Expenditures

(2)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population

81

(3)

(4)

-1.01 E-4
(0.43)

Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)

(Total Campaign Spending for State
Senate)/Population

Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

Per Capita State Highway
Expenditures

...

...

0.00452
(4.19)

0.003597
(4.85)

Per Capita State Welfare
Expenditures

...

...

0.00114
(1.93)

0.00123
(2.44)

Per Capita State Health
Expenditures

...

...

0.00028
(1.98)

0.00021
(1.57)

Intercept

5.9357
(2.90)

5.7448
(3.76)

-1.8378
(2.00)

-1.5272
(3.31)

Adj-R2=

0.8660

0.8142

0.8767

0.8426

Root Mean Sq Error

0.2946

0.3519

0.2254

0.2864

Observations

61.0

61.0

82

(3)

61.0

(4)

61.0

Table 11: Explaining Total Campaign Expenditures by Type of State Spending:
Expenditures for All Candidates Running for the Governorships
(Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. Year and regional dummy variables are not reported.
Specifications 1 and 3 do not show the coefficients for the vector of variables that control for the number
of candidates and the closeness of races in the general and primary elections. This is the same set of
control variables used in specifications 1 and 3 in Table 5. Specifications 2 and 4 use the same set of
control variables that were employed in specifications 2 and 4 in Table 5. Again the results for these
other variables are not reported.)
Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)

(Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)/Population

Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

Ln (State Education
Expenditures)

0.5126
(3.89)

0.5812
(4.67)

...

...

Ln (State Highway
Expenditures)

0.2343
(1.97)

0.2851
(2.75)

...

...

Ln (State Welfare
Expenditures)

-0.0032
(0.39)

-0.0422
(0.53)

...

...

Ln (State Health Expenditures)

0.0072
(0.55)

0.0060
(0.48)

...

...

...

...

0.0014
(4.493)

Per Capita State Education
Expenditures
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(3)

(4)

0.00143
(4.52)

Dependent Variables
Ln (Total Campaign Spending for State
House)

(Total Campaign Spending for
Governorship)/Population

Exogenous Variables

(1)

(2)

Per Capita State Highway
Expenditures

...

...

0.00083
(2.66)

0.00089
(2.85)

Per Capita State Welfare
Expenditures

...

...

-0.00014
(0.45)

-0.00023
(0.74)

Per Capita State Health
Expenditures

...

...

0.00028
(0.90)

0.00021
(0.67)

Intercept

3.9357
(2.88)

3.7448
(2.76)

-1.4378
(1.00)

-1.0272
(0.91)

Adj-R2=

0.7915

0.7242

0.7767

0.7026

Root Mean Sq Error

0.4946

0.5519

1.2254

1.2864

Observations

164.0

164.0

84

(3)

164.0

(4)

164.0

Table 12: Explaining The Total Number of Candidates Running for State House,
State Senate, and Gubernatorial Offices
(Dependent variable is the total number of candidates by type of election, Absolute t-statistics are in
parentheses, year and regional dummy variables are not reported.)
Exogenous Variables

State Senate

State House

Governorships

Per Capita State Expenditures

0.0091
(3.16)

0.0123
(1.39)

-0.00018
(0.641)

Per Capita Income

-0.00129
(1.52)

-0.0051
(1.20)

4.9 E-5
(0.786)

2.034
(5.83)

...

60.88
(0.95)

...

Number of Seats Up for Election

2.266
(12.17)

%Seats with No Incumbent Running in
General

-8.1852
(0.51)

%Seats with No Incumbent Running in Rep.
Primary

49.21
(3.89)

135.02
(2.94)

...

%Seats with No Incumbent Running in Dem.
Primary

60.56
(5.40)

115.93
(1.91)

...

No Incumbent Running in General

...

...

-0.7466
(0.873)

No Incumbent Running in Republican
Primary

...

...

1.3451
(1.534)

85

Exogenous Variables
No Incumbent Running in Democratic
Primary

State Senate
...

State House
...

Term Limits

4.26
(1.71)

Abs % Difference in Control of State Senate

-0.1180
(0.01)

Abs % Difference in Control of State House

...

Split Control of State Legislature

...

...

5 E-7
(2.12)

2.2 E-6
(2.60)

Population
Intercept
Adj-R2=

-58.947
(3.11)
0.8118

42.20
(2.29)
...
-69.66
(1.58)

-49.59
(0.47)

1.4268
(1.718)
0.4092
(0.934)
...
...
-0.1312
(0.377)
2.66 E-8
(1.017)
5.9755
(4.142)

0.7972

0.2962
1.4257

Root Mean Sq Error

10.031

10.9760

Observations

61.0

69.0

86

Governorships

164.0

Table 13: Explaining Congressional Tenure as a Function of Federal Government Expenditures
(Dependent variable is the number of terms that a new congressman entering during a given congress
will serve. The number of terms served is calculated using the ten terms following the term when a
congressman enters office. Cochrane-Orcutt regressions were used because of the presence of serial
collinearity. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.)
Exogenous Variables

(1)

Per Capita Federal
Government Expenditures

...

Ln(Federal Government
Expenditures)
Male Life Expectancy

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

...

...

0.000089
(0.881)

0.00014
(1.030)

6.84 e-6
(0.045)

0.1632
(1.250)

0.278
(1.325)

-.0539
(0.186)

...

...

...

...

0.0337
(0.959)

0.2007
(1.974)

...

0.0246
(0.714)

0.1934
(1.994)

-.0013
(0.539)

-.0027
(1.429)

-.00196
(0.834)

-.00139
(0.594)

...

-5.81 e-6
(0.836)

-8.49 e-6
(0.898)

Days Congress is in
Session during term

-.00031
(1.617)

-.0024
(1.012)

Real Congressional Salary
in 1985 dollars

-2.28 e-6
(0.3088)

-4.69 E-6
(0.502)

Ratio of Congressional
Salary to Law Partner’s
Salary
Time Trend

...

0.0718
(4.157)

...

0.06857
(1.858)
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...

-.0307
(0.029)

...

...

-0.02111
(0.020)

0.0280
(0.603)

0.0873
(9.721)

0.0899
(2.990)

0.02485
0.559)

Intercept

-1.248
(0.468)

-1.9521
(0.495)

-7.0867
(0.898)

2.232
(6.264)

0.0899
(2.499)

-7.9239
(1.254)

Adj-R2=

0.8401

0.5978

0.5887

0.8364

0.5888

0.5827

Root Mean Sq Error

0.50802

0.5978

0.6533

0.5116

0.6038

0.6539

Observations

59.0

37.0

22.0

59.0

37.0

22.0

Sample Means and Standard Deviations
Mean
Per Capita Federal Government Expenditures

1308.68

Standard Deviation
1665.30

Number
69.0

Ln(Federal Government Expenditures)

24.38

2.305

69.0

Male Life Expectancy

60.34

8.549

43.0

Days Congress is in Session during term
Real Congressional Salary in 1985 dollars
Ratio of Congressional Salary to Law Partner’s Salary

209.61

61.65

62.0

64,429.78

20,003.90

67.0

1.389

88

0.2583

24.0

